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AN EXPLANATORY ATLAS
OF THE FAR EAST

AN EXPLANATORY ATLAS OF THE FAR EAST

by
G. F. HUDSON
and
MARTHE RAJCHMAN

with a foreword by
SIR ARTHUR SALTER

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Foreword to the Second Edition

BY SIR ARTHUR SALTER

Nothing could be better than this new edition of this book as a help to understanding the course of events in the Far East, and now that Japan has entered the war we all need such a guide as a daily companion.

Foreword to the First Edition

The major changes in international politics are usually marked by the introduction of new members into the family of Great Powers. So long as the protagonists of the international drama continue the same, the pattern of the play changes little. Certain combinations of Powers are determined by geography, by economic and strategic considerations, and by the natural tendency of international forces to come to a balance; even internal revolution as a rule leads a country to only a temporary aberration from its 'natural' allies.

It is when new Powers appear on the scene that the pattern is drastically recast. In the eighteenth century international politics was transformed by the rise of Prussia and the intrusion into Europe of Russia. A similar revolution has taken place in our own generation with the *arrival* among the Great Powers of Japan; and as the present struggle proceeds, the world is beginning to realize what may be the future strength and importance of a unified China.

Sixty years ago Far Eastern affairs were a subject for the curious, an intriguing matter for scholars and for experts in Foreign

FOREWORD

Ministries, but rarely a cause for discussion or anxiety at Cabinet councils. To-day all this is changed. How changed was shown in August of this year when the world trembled lest an incident in an obscure corner of Manchuria should light off universal war.

From now on the Far East must be in all our calculations. We can make no move in Europe without an eye on Singapore and Tokyo; no violence can happen in Shanghai or its vast hinterland which is entirely of indifference to us.

As a result there has lately been a quite unprecedented public desire to master the main facts about Far Eastern politics, and this book by Mr. Hudson and Miss Rajchman is particularly timely. By a remarkable achievement in compression and lucid exposition the authors have given us in the text and maps the facts required for interpreting the present situation in the Far East and indeed almost any conceivable situation likely to arise there. The book is of equal value to the historian, the journalist, the man of public affairs, and to the citizen anxious to keep abreast of the times. Mr. Hudson has once more, as in *Far East in World Politics*, shown how the modern technique of political analysis can be combined with the lucidity and elegance of an earlier period of political literature; and Miss Rajchman's maps are worthy of this high standard. For many years this book is likely to be a standard reference work.

ARTHUR SALTER

August 1938

AUTHORS' PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The purpose of this book is to provide a commentary in a geographical framework on the long-term factors of Far Eastern politics. With a great war in progress the situation is changing rapidly from day to day and many familiar landmarks may suddenly be blotted out in the near future, but the flood of events, however turbulent it may be, still has its movement in a setting of permanent or relatively permanent facts—the physical structure of lands and seas, the ethnography shaped by long ages of history, the natural resources and main developments of agriculture, industry and commerce, the principal lines of communication and the fundamental relations of strategic position. An attempt has here been made to indicate these both by words and by maps.

Our grateful thanks are due to Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for information with regard to naval bases in the Pacific and to Mr. G. Wint for much valuable assistance and advice in the preparation of material for the book.

G. F. HUDSON
M. RAJCHMAN

August 1938

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Chapter I

THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST

There have been in history three ways of approach to the region of the world known as the Far East: the first, by sea from the Indian Ocean; the second, overland from the countries of the Middle East; and the third, across the Pacific from North or South America.

The trans-Pacific approach belongs to modern times; it dates only from the voyage of Magellan in 1519. The Polynesians navigated vast expanses of the Pacific in outrigger canoes, but there is no evidence that they ever jumped the gaps that separate Hawaii and Easter Island from the Americas. Disabled Japanese junks have occasionally been carried by wind and current to the coast of California, but no definite knowledge of America seems to have come to Asia by such accidents. The pre-Columbian natives of the New World were not seafarers, and the close proximity of North America and Asia at the Bering Strait, however important for the peopling of the Americas with human stock, belongs to a zone too remote from the areas of old civilization to have significance in history. It may be said without considerable qualification that up to the sixteenth century of our era the Pacific Ocean imposed an absolute limit to human intercourse east of Asia.

The approaches by sea and land from the Middle East, on the other hand, have been in use from remote antiquity, and an account of them must reveal the natural boundaries of the Far Eastern region, for it is just the main obstacles to communication with the farther parts of Asia which determine the most suitable limits for the three conventional divisions of the continent into Near, Middle and Far East. It is always possible, of course, to divide an area of the earth's surface merely according to a scale of

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remoteness, but such a regional partition should have more of geographical significance than this, and the three degrees of removal which we recognize in viewing Asia from Europe actually do correspond to definable natural areas.

Leaving out of account the Arctic littoral, Asia has three coastlines: to the west, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, to the south, the Indian Ocean, and to the east, the Pacific. Before the making of the canal, the isthmus of Suez barred any access for shipping from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and even now it remains a very definite dividing line. From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific there is a continuous natural seaway, but the Malay Peninsula, reaching south to within two degrees of the Equator, makes a very sharp corner at the south-eastern extremity of Asia, and Singapore is no less of a boundary than Suez. The three Asiatic coastlines are thus clearly separated, and their hinterlands may be identified with the three regions of the East; by this criterion the Near East includes Turkey and Syria (with Egypt), the Middle East, Arabia, Iraq, Iran and India, and the Far East, Indo-China and China.

These divisions by relation to coastline would not, however, have so much significance if they did not correspond to two well-marked insulating barriers inland. The Ararat highlands and the Hamad (Syrian desert) intervene between the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf lands, and formerly set an eastward limit to that Mediterranean-centred political creation, the Roman empire. Similarly, a vast mountain system comprising the Pamirs-Tibet and Yunnan-Burma highlands shuts off China from India and Iran, the mountains being reinforced to the north of Tibet by the deserts of Sinkiang. These two great ramparts of natural obstruction may be regarded as fixing the confines of the Near, Middle and Far Eastern regions.

The Pamirs-Burma mountain system affords by far the more impervious barrier of the two, and accounts for the high degree of isolation which was the condition of Far Eastern history until quite recently. Though the isolation of the Far East has often been exaggerated, it remains true that China has been in the

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past more secluded from cultural contact and interaction with an outer world than any section of the region extending from Spain to Bengal; the history of China is more self-contained than that of India, Persia, Greece or Western Europe. The Achaemenid kings of ancient Persia, Alexander the Great and the Arab Caliphs all bridged the gap between Near and Middle East and ruled from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, but none of them passed the Pamirs and penetrated to China; nor did any Indian kingdom extend its sway beyond the Himalayas or east of the Salween. Buddhism was propagated from India throughout the Far East, but it never displaced the traditional native religion of China; Islam also reached China, but it never created there a new epoch of history, as it did in India. The snows of Sarikol and the Kum Tagh sands repelled the temporal power of Persepolis or Baghdad and weakened the impact of those spiritual forces which they could not forbid.

By longitude Tibet and Sinkiang, lying north of the Ganges plain, should be comprised within the Middle East, but the course of history which has made them to this day—at least nominally—parts of China, corresponds to a strong geographical predisposition; they are more accessible from the east than from the south or west, though just lately, since the construction of the Turksib railway, the gravitational pull of the Soviet Union has been very strong in Sinkiang. From the great peak of Khan Tengri (23,620 feet) in the T'ien-shan south-west of Kulja round to the great gorge by which the Dihong cuts its way down from Tibet to become the Brahmaputra in the plains of Assam, the formal frontier of China follows the line of the most tremendous mountain rampart in the world. The T'ien-shan, the Pamirs, the Karakorum and the Himalayas are all mountain ranges on a grand scale, and the last-named is backed by the vast plateau of Tibet, a country where many tens of thousands of square miles lie higher than the summit of Mont Blanc. On these upper levels the way for caravans has always been arduous in the extreme; Marco Polo tells of the forty days' journey on the high Pamirs, where 'in all this way you shall come to no town, nor

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habitation, nor grass, and therefore it is needfull for those that do travel that way to carry with them provision and victuals for themselves and their horses'.

It is possible to avoid the high mountains by going to the north of the T'ien-shan and then south-east to China *via* Hami. There is a clear way from west to east across Asia through the gap between the T'ien-shan and the mountains of the Altai system. This way went the caravan route from the Sea of Azov to Peiping described by Pegolotti in the fourteenth century, and this way runs the road from the Turksib railway to Lanchow by which Russian munitions are supplied to China in the present war. But for access to China from India or Persia such a route has always meant a long *détour* added on to a distance already excessive for commerce before the age of mechanical transport. For an approach from the direction of the lower Volga it was more convenient, but, whatever its natural advantages, it has been at most times in history rendered extremely difficult for trade or travel by the nomadic barbarism of the steppes through which it passes. The same applies in an even greater degree to the open country to the north of the Altai; here there could be no question of a route from Indian or Mediterranean countries to the Far East, and the opening of trans-Asian communications in such high latitudes depended on the development of Russia and her expansion eastward through Siberia—it dates, therefore, only from the seventeenth century.

Turning from the north to the south of the great central mountain block of Asia, we find obstruction of a somewhat different kind, but no less formidable. From the south-eastern corner of the Tibetan plateau mountain ranges splay out towards the south, reaching the sea in Tennasserim, where the Malay Peninsula juts out from the land-mass of Indo-China. These mountains diminish rapidly in height from north to south—though there are large areas over 10,000 feet as far south as lat. 25°—and on this border there are no perils from blizzard and avalanche or complications of desert and nomadic marauders. But an exceptionally high annual rainfall—the world's

THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST

record of 424 inches average is held by Cherrapunji in the Khasi hills in Assam—clothes the hill tracts facing the Bay of Bengal with dense tropical vegetation, which makes them hardly less difficult to traverse than the loftier heights of the Pamirs or Himalayas. Nor has the human population been more favourable to economic and cultural contacts of a high order than it has in the steppe and alpine grasslands of Central Asia. An environment of mountain forests has kept a wide region in the interior of Indo-China in various stages of primitive culture more or less impervious to influences from areas of higher civilization to west, east and south; the Naga, Mishmi, Kachin and Wa tribes were head-hunters until yesterday, and the more civilized Shans and Karens, forming numerous petty principalities in their hill-girt valleys, have always stoutly resisted incorporation in any large, centralized state.

With such obstacles to overland communication between the Middle and Far East, it might seem, nevertheless, that the continuous seaway from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific would afford a sufficiently close contact. Yet the Malay Peninsula has been up to modern times a strong factor of separation, for not only did it mean a long, roundabout voyage from the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea, but it diverted maritime traffic into waters where piracy used to flourish with peculiar vigour. Malaya, Sumatra and Borneo, with their numerous adjacent small islands, lying within the zone of equatorial rain forest, always remained a region of backward culture, the inhabitants of which preferred freebooting to regular trade, so that shipping on the way between India and China was at all times in hazard. With the arrival of gun-armed European ships in the seas round Malaya the pirate *prao* met more than its match, but in earlier centuries the development of commerce in these waters was seriously impeded by a piracy too ubiquitous and elusive ever to be suppressed. Even after Malacca had grown into a great emporium for trade from Java and the Moluccas, as well as from Siam and China, the institutions of orderly economic life were little in evidence, and the Italian traveller Varthema, who

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visited Malacca in 1506, complains that 'one cannot walk about at night here, because people are killed like dogs, and the merchants who come sleep on their ships. . . . The king has a governor to administer justice for foreigners, but the people of the country take the law into their own hands, and they are the worst race that was ever created on earth'.

In view of the length and dangers of the voyage through the Straits of Malacca and round Malaya, trade tended to make use of a portage across the isthmus of Kra, renouncing the advantages of continuous voyage, but reducing the risks from piracy. The isthmus of Kra appears to have been the main centre for the diffusion of Indian influences in Indo-China during the early centuries of our era,¹ and later a route from Bangkok to Tenasserim was much in use for the export of Chinese porcelain to Islamic countries—a trade well attested by the quantities of broken wares recovered from the earth in this area.

With or without the Kra short cut, however, the 'south-east passage' failed throughout ancient and medieval times to attain primacy as a means of access to the Far East, and the overland routes through Sinkiang, in spite of their difficulties, retained most of the traffic there was. The main trans-Asian caravan route in the second century A.D. ran from Antioch in Syria to Ctesiphon (on the Tigris below Baghdad) and thence by the modern Hamadan, Damghan, Merv, Balkh and the Pamir passes to Tashkurgan in Sarikol, where there was a mart for Chinese raw silk, which was brought from China Proper through Sinkiang either by the route to the north of the Taklamakan desert (Anhsi-Hami-Turfan-Karashar-Kuchar-Aksu-Kashgar) or by that to the south of it (Anhsi-Tunhuang-Charkhlik-Charchan-Keriya-Khotan-Yarkand). No road to the north of the T'ien-shan appears to have been used in that period, but later on a trade route from the Black Sea to Samarkand *via* Astrakhan and Khiva, which became important from the sixth century onwards, was extended to China by way of Kulja,

¹ The Khmer culture of Cambodia, represented by the famous ruins of Angkor, thus received its initial stimulus.

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Urumchi¹ and Hami. In the time of Marco Polo both the trans-Pamir and Kulja-Urumchi routes were in use, corresponding to lines of approach to China from south and north of the Caspian respectively; Marco himself, coming through Persia, travelled by Kashgar, Khotan and Charchan, but the elder Polos came from Sarai on the Volga to Bokhara, and they probably went on by Kulja.

From India and from the Bay of Bengal there were two direct overland routes to China: one across the Himalayas and Tibet *via* Lhasa, and the other by Burma and Yunnan. So great were the disadvantages, however, of both these ways that the main lines of communication between India and China, during the period when Buddhism was propagated from India all over the Far East, were through Sinkiang. From Kashmir there was always the road to Kashgar by Hunza and the Mintaka pass (15,450 feet), or the Balkh-Kashgar road could be reached farther west *via* Chitral or Kabul—a roundabout way of getting from the Ganges to the Yellow River, but the best available in pre-modern conditions of travel.

After the arrival of European shipping in the Indian Ocean with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1498, the sea route round Malaya was opened up more than ever before, and became by far the most important approach to the Far East. The traditional overland routes fell into decline, and, in particular, the old Khotan-Charchan route was almost completely abandoned. On the other hand, the last four centuries have seen the development by Western powers of two new lines of approach: the trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific.


The Russians, pressing eastward to the north of the Altai, reached Lake Baikal early in the seventeenth century and opened trade with China across Mongolia along the route Irkutsk-Kiakhta-Urga-Peiping. But when in the last decade of the nineteenth century the building of a transcontinental railway was undertaken by Russia, it was decided to carry it, not across the Gobi to Peiping and Tientsin, but to the most southerly

¹ Now officially Tihwa, but better known by its old name.

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Russian port on the Pacific. The political situation in 1896 having enabled the Russians to get permission from China to build the line through Manchuria, it became possible to approach China overland from Russia without having to cross either high mountains or deserts. The trans-Siberian was eventually linked with the Chinese railway system by the connection Harbin–Mukden–Peiping, entering China not from the north-west or north, but from the *north-east*. The Russians have had plans ever since the 'nineties for a short-cut line from the Trans-Siberian to China Proper *via* Urga or Hami, but no such railway has yet been built, though there is now a line as far as Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia).

The approach to Asia across the Pacific dates only, as has been already pointed out, from Magellan's voyage in 1519. Up to about 1850 ships came from the direction of Cape Horn or the Magellan Straits, having sailed round South America from Europe or New England; or they came from the Pacific ports of Latin America, Mexico being the most northerly region of European settlement on the Pacific coast. Then, with the rapid growth of San Francisco as a port of the U.S.A. from 1848 onward, shipping began to sail thence almost due west—actually with a slant southward through six degrees of latitude—to Shanghai, which had been first opened to foreign trade in 1842. Japan, which had hitherto held place as the far end of the Far East, the Cipangu which Marco Polo heard of but never reached, lay in the path of the new oceanic trade route, and it was the Americans coming across the Pacific, not the Europeans approaching from the south, who in 1853 compelled the self-secluded Japanese to enter into relations with the outer world.



— Railways — Steamship penetration — Roads — Free access
 — Access barred
 Mountains: Over 3000 feet Over 9000 feet
 - - - - - Boundary of 18 out of 28 Chinese provinces


I. WAYS OF ACCESS TO CHINA (MODERN)

Chapter II

LANDS AND PEOPLES

The region of the Far East may be divided into three zones: a southern zone extending from lat. 10° south of the Equator to 20° north of it, a middle one from 20° N. to 40° N., and a northern from 40° N. to the Arctic. The southern includes Indonesia, Malaya and most of Indo-China, the middle covers China Proper, Tibet and the main areas of Korea and Japan, and the northern comprises Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia—a vast continental area which in its relation to China Proper may conveniently be termed the Northland.

The southern zone of the Far East lies entirely within the tropics. It includes an equatorial zone, extending to about five degrees on both sides of the Equator, in which there is hardly any seasonal variation of temperature or rainfall; this climatic belt appears to be very unfavourable to human progress, and to such environmental influence must be attributed the fact that Indian civilization, diffused over the nearer parts of Indonesia and Indo-China, never took root in Sumatra, Malaya or Borneo, but flourished remarkably in Cambodia and Siam to the north and in Java to the south—countries with definite alternations of wet and dry seasons. The southern zone of the Far East contains no deserts; it has almost everywhere a very high annual rainfall and is for the most part heavily forested in its natural state. The rains of Indo-China are provided by the monsoon wind system of south-eastern Asia. In winter the winds blow outward towards the south-west, south and south-east from an intense high-pressure belt over Mongolia, Sinkiang and southern Siberia; in summer the direction is reversed and they blow inward from the Indian Ocean and China Seas as bearers of rain. Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, which are affected



2. CLIMATIC REGIONS OF THE FAR EAST

LANDS AND PEOPLES

climatically by the arid land surface of Australia, have a monsoon system of their own with wet west and dry east winds.

The middle zone of the Far East may be reckoned as sub-tropical; it lies within the sphere of the monsoons, and has wet summers and dry winters like the lands to the south, but it is distinguished by a considerable annual range of temperature and by a marked shrinking of rainfall towards the north-west, leading to sub-arid conditions on the borders of Mongolia. China has everywhere a hot summer, but it has the coldest winter—south to the Nanling mountains—for any part of the world in parallel latitudes; bitterly cold north-west winds sweep from Mongolia over the North China Plain, and the Poyang lake to the south of the Yangtse is sometimes frozen over below the latitude of Cairo. The South China littoral, the more sheltered valleys of western China, and Japan, except for its north-western coasts, escape such severe winters, and the contrast of these areas with North China is emphasized by the still more important differences in the matter of rainfall. Mean annual rainfalls are 85 inches at Hongkong, 58 at Tokyo, 45 at Shanghai, 25 at Peiping and 14 at Taiyuan (Shansi). Most of China south of the Yangtse has over 50 inches of rain in a year and is naturally a green and well-forested land; the same holds good of Japan, where luxuriant timber covers nearly all the ground that is not under cultivation. North China, on the other hand, is a region of comparatively low rainfall, declining below 10 inches in parts of Kansu; in good years the rains are sufficient for agriculture, but they often fail to reach the necessary minimum and the resulting crop failures produce famine. Much of North China is now practically treeless; this is partly due to artificial deforestation—always terribly effective in such marginal lands—but the country, even in early times, can only have been lightly timbered as compared with South China, Indo-China or Japan. Its character predestined it to be the original seat of the great independent civilization of the Far East, for under neolithic cultural conditions the zone of decisive initial progress was the sub-tropical, sub-arid, the grade between the well-watered

LANDS AND PEOPLES

forest land and the steppe or desert. Indian civilization arose in the dry lands of Sind and the Punjab, and only later spread over the rain-favoured plains of the Ganges; similarly, Chinese civilization arose in the basin of the Yellow River and had attained there a high level more than a thousand years before we find evidence of any such development in the valleys of the Yangtse, the Si-kiang or the Mekong.

The contrast between the Yellow River and Yangtse lands in the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 221) was noted by the Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, who describes the latter as a 'large territory sparsely populated, where people eat rice and drink fish soup; where land is tilled with fire and hoed with water; where people collect fruits and shellfish for food and enjoy self-sufficiency without commerce. The region is fertile and suffers no famine. Hence the people are lazy and poor and do not bother to accumulate wealth; south of the Yangtse and the Hwai there are neither hungry nor frozen people, nor a family which owns a thousand gold'.¹ Yet the Yangtse valley came in course of time to be no less intensively cultivated and densely peopled than the old China of the Yellow River, and this result was brought about by colonization from the north; the natural fertility of the south country was made to yield its wealth to a technique of agriculture developed under more arduous conditions.


The land areas of the southern and middle zones of the Far East are everywhere capable of cultivation except for mountainous tracts and the higher plateaux of Tibet. In the third zone, however, we come to an immense region over by far the greater part of which agriculture is forbidden either by dryness or frigidity of climate. The Northland, extending from the Great Wall of China to the Arctic Ocean, is divisible into three sub-zones: one of steppe and desert in the forties of latitude, a second, of forest (generally sparse east of the Yenisei), and a third, of treeless 'tundra' above the Arctic Circle. Of the steppe region

¹ Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *chüan* 102. Quoted by Ch'ao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, p. 98.

NOTE ON MAP 3

This map is intended to indicate the distribution of the principal ethnic types without reference to density of population. For the relative density of population in the provinces of China Proper and Manchuria, see maps 18 and 24.

The Tibetans, Turks, Mongols and Tungus occupy large areas on the map, but with very low density; the Chinese and Russian areas, on the other hand, are generally of high density, and the Chinese and Russians often form the urban population in regions where the native peoples still predominate in the open country. Thus all towns of Siberia may be counted as Russian and those of the Miao, Shan and Lolo districts of the west and south-west of China as Chinese.



3. ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE FAR EAST

LANDS AND PEOPLES

only the fringes can be cultivated, but the whole provides pasture for animals and has thus been traditionally the domain of horse-riding, tent-dwelling, milk-sustained herdsmen, who represent a culture diametrically opposed to that of the sedentary, agricultural Chinese. These nomads have always been the neighbours of China to the north, and until recently were one of the main factors in Chinese history.

Before the coming of the Russians regular agriculture in the Northland was confined to the piedmont oases of Sinkiang and the pale of Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria. The belt of arable land along the present Trans-Siberian railway to the north of Mongolia and in northern Manchuria remained wilderness, being cut off from Chinese colonization or influence by nomad-infested steppe and lacking river communication with the south—the fact that all the great rivers of northern Asia flow either to the Arctic Ocean (the Ob, Yenisei and Lena) or to the northerly Okhotsk Sea (the Amur) has contributed much to the historic isolation of Siberia. Up to the middle of the seventeenth century there was nothing in north-eastern Asia above the forty-fifth parallel of latitude except a barbarism with gradations from the hunting-and-fishing economy of the Chukchis and Ghilaks through the reindeer-keeping of the Yakuts and Tungus to the horse-and-cattle nomadism of the Mongols.

The Northland Pacific littoral has a character of its own which is extremely adverse to human habitation. This region combines the intense cold of the Siberian winter with a chilly, wet summer unfavourable either for agriculture or stock-raising. East of the Stanovoi mountains the northern limit of cereals descends to about the latitude of Paris, and at Vladivostok in the parallel of Marseilles the sea freezes for four months in the year. The climatic conditions closely resemble those of Labrador in similar latitudes on the east coast of North America, and even Soviet planning has not so far made much out of this territory. In former times Possiet Bay was the northern limit for shipping, Chinese, Japanese or Korean, and no attempt was ever made to colonize the coasts beyond.

LANDS AND PEOPLES

Turning from environment and basic economic types to ethnography, we find that the whole of the southern and middle zones of the Far East, with the exception of Korea and Japan, is occupied by peoples belonging to three great linguistic families: the Austronesian, the Austroasiatic and the Sinitic. It is worthy of note, as indicating the separateness of the Far Eastern region from very remote times, that neither the Indo-European, Hamito-Semitic nor Dravidian families are represented in the Far East, and that the three Far Eastern families are not represented in Asia farther west than Tibet and central India.

The Austronesian language family comprises three sub-families: Indonesian, Melanesian and Polynesian. Its range extends over Malaya and all the archipelagoes from Sumatra to Easter Island and from Timor to Formosa; it also has a trans-oceanic branch in Madagascar. It covers a large number of distinct spoken languages, of which the most important at the present day are Malay, Javanese, Sundanese and Tagalog—all of the Indonesian sub-family.

The Austroasiatic group includes several languages of backward tribal areas scattered from the South China Sea to central India and two important living tongues—Khmer (Cambodian) and Annamese.¹ Over a wide area between the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific older stocks of Austroasiatic speech have been submerged by later Sinitic-speaking invaders from the north, such as the Burmese and Siamese. The Sinitic family has three branches: Chinese, Tibeto-Burman and Tai (including Siamese, Shan and the Miao dialects of South China); it belongs entirely to the Far East, and has not spread north of the Kunlun mountains and the Great Wall of China except with Chinese colonization in historic times.

The greater part of the Northland was held before the arrival of the Russians by tongues of the Altaian family, classifiable into Turkish, Mongol and Tungusic branches. This language group,

¹ Annamese is classified by some with the Tai group of the Sinitic family. See, however, J. Przyluski, *Langues austroasiatiques* in *Les Langues du monde*, ed. A. Meillet and M. Cohen, pp. 395–8.

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owing to its association with nomadism, is very widely spread; its range extends to the Mediterranean (Turkey), to the Arctic Ocean (the Yakuts) and to the Pacific (the Tungus), but the total of its speakers is small outside the settled communities of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Beyond the foregoing fourfold classification of Far Eastern languages fall Korean, Japanese and certain tribal languages of the extreme north-east of Siberia and the Primorsk, the affinities of which have not yet been discovered.¹ The geographical distribution of these forms of speech on the farthest rim of Asia suggests that they are survivals comparable to Basque in Europe.

On such ethnic foundations cultural tradition and political state-making have in course of time created unities and differences from which nationalities in the modern sense of the word have been, or are being, formed. Besides the two big indigenous nations of the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese, there are to-day about a dozen lesser nationalities which have to be taken into account, and in addition, a large number of human beings living in tribal or petty local units and eluding any 'national' classification.

By cultural tradition older than the arrival of Europeans the peoples of the Far East—leaving out of account the more primitive tribal elements—belong to three different domains of civilization: the Chinese, the Indian and the Islamic. The first of these is native to the Far East, whereas the other two are intrusive from the west.

Chinese civilization, having grown up in the basin of the Yellow River, extended its domain in two ways: through colonization by the Chinese themselves and through the reception of Chinese culture by non-Chinese peoples. The former type of expansion prevailed as far south as Hainan and formed the modern China Proper, including the Yangtse and Si-kiang basins; the latter

¹ It is held by some that Japanese is related to the Indonesian group and therefore to the Austronesian family of languages, but there is so far no consensus of opinion on the matter among philologists.

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kind brought Annam, Korea and Japan within the Chinese cultural sphere, all these three countries adopting classical literary Chinese as the language of education and learning.

Indian culture from about the beginning of our era penetrated by colonization and influence Indo-China (except Annam) and the nearer parts of Indonesia. The traditional culture of Siam and Cambodia is thus affiliated, but in Malaya and Indonesia the Hindu-Buddhist influence was superseded by Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and now survives only in Bali. In another direction Indian cultural expansion was even more far-reaching; from the first century A.D. Buddhism was transmitted to China along the silk-trading caravan routes through Sinkiang, and through China it reached also Korea and Japan. Within the sphere of the Chinese literary tradition, however, the Indian religion was always a subsidiary element—except for a while in Japan. More profound was the effect of Buddhism in Tibet, where it assumed the special form known as lamaism and dominated the whole life of the country. From Tibet Lama-Buddhism spread north-eastward to Mongolia, and both in Tibet and Mongolia modern nationalist feeling has its roots in a national 'church', even though it is anti-clerical in tendency.


Following in the wake of India's spiritual expansion, Islam spread from Arabia and Iran, and likewise reached the Far East on two courses, one to the south and the other to the north. Across the Indian Ocean Arab traders and adventurers propagated their faith among the Malays of Sumatra, who carried it to other parts of Indonesia. The Hindu power in Java was destroyed by the capture of Madjopait in 1478 and Java became entirely Mohammedan. Islam was spread eastward as far as Mindanao, Ceram and Timor, but everywhere except in Java prevailed only in coastal districts, the inland tribes retaining their primitive paganism.

In Central Asia the Turki-speaking people of Sinkiang were converted to Islam as were their kinsmen to the west of the Pamirs. The line between Moslem and Buddhist now corresponds almost exactly to the linguistic division of Turk and Mongol. Further,

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Islam, cutting across the line of Buddhist expansion from Tibet to Mongolia, established itself in north-west China and created the numerous Chinese-speaking Moslem community known as Tungans, who can hardly be counted as a separate nationality, but form a very distinct and centrifugal section of the Chinese people.

To these formative factors of cultural inheritance must be added, as constituents of nationality, historical traditions of political sovereignty and state-making. In China there is the great tradition of the 'Middle Kingdom' and of the Son of Heaven, who before 1860 could not recognize any other earthly monarch as his equal. In Japan there is the national sovereign of divine descent, who, whatever the chaos of Japanese internal politics, was always the mystical talisman of the 'Yamato race'. Korea, Annam, Cambodia and Siam have their traditions of strong, organized national kingdoms. The Mongols derive an intense racial pride from the memory of the empire of Genghiz Khan, and the Tibetans have their long-established sovereignty of the holy Dalai Lama. In Indonesia there is still the memory of the old Javanese empire of Mataram. These historical continuities serve as nuclei for modern national feeling, even when the nationalism is anti-monarchical and destructive of traditional culture; though popular nationalism and its jargon are recent innovations, the main lines of nationality which now exist were already drawn before Europeans ever reached the Far East. To the old ethno-political units, however, the age of European ascendancy has added two more: the Russian, which is the product of immigration from Europe, and the Filipino, which is a creation of Spanish colonialism.



4. POPULATIONS OF FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

Chapter III

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There were in November, 1941, excluding 'Manchukuo', nine recognized sovereignties within the confines of the Far East. Of these only three—China, Japan, and Siam—belonged to indigenous nations; the rest were held by 'Western' nations with their homelands in Europe or North America—Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. All these six powers had acquired their territories in the Far East by some kind of expansion, more or less violent, since a Portuguese squadron first arrived at Malacca in 1509. In the sequel, however, a distinction must be drawn between the Far Eastern lands of the Soviet Union and the 'possessions' of other Western powers. The latter were in every case imperial ascendancies over areas already well populated, and the ruling nations were represented by mere handfuls of administrators, soldiers, capitalist entrepreneurs and technicians, who formed insignificant minorities among the native inhabitants; in Siberia, on the other hand, the Russians have settled on land previously uncultivated, as the English have in Canada or Australia, and form the great majority of the total population, so that Russian nationality, as well as Russian (or Soviet Union) state power, has been established there. The Russians are to-day a Far Eastern nation in a way the British, French and Americans are not, though their actual numbers are small to the east of the Yenisei, and their strength as a Great Power is based on their wealth of population and resources in Europe and West Siberia.

The history of European commercial and imperial expansion in the Far East begins in 1509, when a Portuguese squadron under Sequiera arrived at Malacca to open trade eleven years after Vasco da Gama had first reached India round the Cape of

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Good Hope. The usual disputes having arisen, Albuquerque, the Portuguese Captain-General of the Indies, attacked and captured Malacca in 1511. The Portuguese thus acquired a monopoly of the lucrative trade in spices from the Moluccas; to complete their control they annexed the Moluccas in 1522 and held them until 1583, when they were driven out by a rebellion of the natives. Their principal rivals in these waters in the early days were the Spanish, who crossed the Pacific from Mexico and tried to break the Portuguese hold on the Moluccas; failing in this, the Spanish went farther north and conquered the group of islands which they named the Philippines in honour of King Philip II. From Malacca the Portuguese had meanwhile opened up trade with China and Japan, and in China they were granted, in return for services in the suppression of piracy, a lease for a settlement at Macao in 1557. Macao became a Portuguese stronghold and was never lost, though it always remained nominally Chinese territory until it was formally annexed by Portugal in 1845.

With the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch and the English began to make their presence felt in Indonesia. The Dutch in 1619 captured Jacatra in Java and made it their Far Eastern base under the name of Batavia; in 1642 they also took Malacca from the Portuguese, and the latter were finally eliminated from the Archipelago except for a foothold on the island of Timor, the eastern half of which still belongs to them. The English, who tended more and more to concentrate their attention on India, likewise gave way to the Dutch after a period of rivalry. The Spanish, however, continued to hold the Philippines.

Dutch rule was strongly established in Java and the Moluccas; elsewhere in the islands their control was slight, and numerous petty rajas and sultans retained a somewhat diminished independence. The Dutch secured the monopoly of cloves by exterminating the tree in every island but Amboyna, and when the spice trade ceased to be important, they turned their attention to coffee, which they produced in Java under a system of forced labour. To the north of Indonesia they obtained a monopoly of


THE WESTERNERS

European trade with Japan from 1639—and retained it until 1854—and made a settlement on the island of Formosa, which they held until they were driven out by exiles from China, partisans of the fallen Ming dynasty, in 1662.

Both China and Japan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries adopted a policy of restricting foreign trade and residence to particular ports, partly because of their fear of the Catholic Christian missions, which had arrived with the traders and had had a very disturbing effect, especially in Japan; partly because of the desire of the governments to control the trade to their own fiscal advantage; and partly because Far Eastern countries had no system of international diplomatic intercourse and commercial law such as had been evolved in Europe. In China foreign trade was restricted by law to Canton after 1757; in Japan it was confined to Nagasaki, and there allowed only to the Chinese and the Dutch, from 1639. The European nations had to put up with this state of affairs, for up to the second quarter of the nineteenth century they were not in a position to apply coercion to China or Japan as they applied it to the petty principalities of Indonesia.

The Anglo-French wars from 1792 to 1815 brought English armed forces again into the Far East after Holland had fallen under the control of France. The English captured Malacca in 1795 and occupied Java in 1811; these and other Dutch possessions were restored to Holland in 1814, but in 1819 England acquired Singapore by cession from the Sultan of Johore and made it into a great commercial and strategic centre.

In the final partition of Malaya and Indonesia among the Western powers, none of the native potentates were recognized as sovereign, and dominion was distributed in international law, that is, by treaties between Western Powers, often in advance of conquest, or even of exploration. Large areas of Indonesia were not brought under any European authority until the present century; the conquest of Atjeh in northern Sumatra took some thirty years of campaigning. By 1941, however, it can be said that control by the recognized sovereign powers had been made



5. CITIES OF THE FAR EAST 1936

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effective throughout the whole region. The British held all the Malay Peninsula south of Siam either by direct (Straits Settlements) or indirect (Protected Malay States) rule. The Dutch retained Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and the Moluccas, with the exception of eastern Timor, which belonged to Portugal, and the northern part of Borneo, comprising British North Borneo and the British-protected states of Brunei and Sarawak.¹ The dominion of the Philippines passed from Spain to the United States of America by the Spanish-American war of 1898, and at the same time the residue of the Spanish empire in the Pacific, consisting of the Pelew, Mariana and Caroline island groups in the ocean to the east of the Philippines, was ceded by Spain to Germany, to be taken from Germany by Japan in the war of 1914-18.

To the north of Malaya and Indonesia there were up to 1841 no European possessions except for the Portuguese leasehold of Macao and the Russian territory in the extreme north of the continent. The extent of the latter was defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by China with a European power, which was concluded in 1689. The Russians, whose empire in Asia had been founded by Yermak's capture of Sibir in 1581, had reached the Pacific coast at Okhotsk in 1647 and Lake Baikal in 1651; then they came into conflict with the Manchu-Chinese empire which controlled the basin of the Amur, and received a severe check. The Treaty of Nerchinsk fixed the Russo-Chinese border along the Stanovoi mountain range and the Uda river, leaving both banks of the Amur to China; this territorial settlement was not altered until 1858.

The Russian west-to-east advance through the far north of Asia did little to disturb the established order of things in the Far East during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for it went on in a back-world of primitive tribes—Buryats, Yakuts and Tungus—beyond the ken of high politics. It meant, however,

¹ Brunei was declared under British protection in 1888, Sarawak in 1890. The British protectorate over Atjeh in Sumatra was relinquished to the Dutch in 1872.

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that for the first time in history there was a power in the North-land which was not founded on nomadism, and with the first settlements of Russian peasants east of the Yenisei a new nation came into being there.

The great European drive against China began with the Anglo-Chinese war of 1839 and it led to acquisitions in two categories: colonial and semi-colonial. The former kind, territorial gains in full sovereignty, included—

(1) Hongkong: the island ceded to Britain by China in 1841, Kowloon on the mainland added in 1860.

(2) French Indo-China: first annexations in 1862 in Cochin-China, protectorate over Cambodia in 1863, protectorate over Annam and Tongking (previously under Chinese suzerainty) recognized by China after Franco-Chinese war in 1885, Lao territory taken from Siam in 1893.

(3) Russian Far Eastern provinces: all country north of the Amur ceded by China to Russia in 1858, territory east of Usuri down to Korean border (including site of the future Vladivostok) ceded in 1860.

Besides these territories passing under European rule in full sovereignty, China was forced in 1898 to cede the following five districts under leasehold tenure, the occupying powers having complete rights of jurisdiction and military or naval use—

(1) Kiaochow: leased to Germany for 99 years, captured by Japanese 1914, restored to China 1922.

(2) Kwantung (Port Arthur and Dalny, now Ryojun and Dairen): renewable 25 years' lease to Russia, transferred to Japan by Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, lease prolonged to 99 years after ultimatum to China 1915.

(3) Weihaiwei: leased to Britain for 'as long as Russia shall remain in occupation of Port Arthur', restored to China 1930.

(4) Hongkong New Territory, consisting of 'all the land required for the military defence of Hongkong': leased to Britain for 99 years.

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
(5) Kwangchow: leased to France for 99 years.

The leased territories were to all intents and purposes the colonial possessions of the states holding them. There was, however, another category of foreign treaty or customary rights in China which were definitely encroachments on Chinese sovereignty without conferring a generalized territorial control; these included the autonomous foreign 'concessions' and settlements, the foreign gunboats on inland waters, the Legation guards at Peiping and garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area, and the old railway zone system in Manchuria.

The foreign settlement system was closely bound up with the extra-territorial rights which the Western powers, beginning with Britain, acquired for their nationals by treaty. The Westerners in the ports were under the jurisdiction of their own consuls, lived in quarters of their own near their consulates and had their own police. In the long period of disorder and anti-foreign outbreaks in China they successfully asserted their claim to exclude Chinese police and soldiers from the settlements and to have their own armed forces—local volunteers or marines from their countries' warships. Originally suburban quarters, the settlements became in some cases—in particular at Shanghai and Tientsin—the principal business areas of their towns and drew in a Chinese population outnumbering the foreign residents. The growth of these autonomous un-national units—states within a state—provided a grave problem for the time when China should begin to organize a modern-style state administration, claiming in full the normal rights of sovereignty within her borders.

The patrolling of the Yangtse by foreign gunboats was instituted in connection with the foreign settlements up the river and the foreign-owned river shipping. The practice was a fertile source of incidents, the most notable of which was the battle fought by H.M.S. *Cockchafer* in 1926 with forces of the provincial army of Szechwan at Wanhsien more than a thousand miles from the sea.

The stationing of foreign detachments for the protection of



- | | | |
|------------|---|-------|
| 1 Kobe | } | Japan |
| 2 Yokohama | | |
| 3 Osaka | | |
| 4 Moji | | |
| 5 Dalren | | |
| 6 Tientsin | } | China |
| 7 Tsingtao | | |
| 8 Shanghai | | |
| 9 Amoy | | |
| 10 Canton | | |
| 11 Swatow | | |

- | | | |
|------------------------|---|------------------|
| 12 Hongkong | } | British Colonies |
| 13 Singapore | | |
| 14 Haiphong | | |
| 15 Saigon | } | French Colonies |
| 16 Batavia | | |
| 17 Semarang | } | Dutch Colonies |
| 18 Soerabaya | | |
| 19 Bangkok, Siam | | |
| 20 Manila, Philippines | | |

Minimum shown: 1,000,000 tons of overseas traffic. Vladivostok (V), Sovetskaya (S), Nikolaevsk (N) and Rashin (R) fall short of this minimum, but are shown as a matter of interest.

6. PORTS OF THE FAR EAST 1936

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the Legations in Peiping and the guarding of the railway to Tientsin was authorized by the treaty of 1901, which settled accounts for the 'Boxer' anti-foreign outbreak of the previous year. The garrisons were meant to provide against renewed surprise attacks by anti-foreign bands, but, having once been established, they became a permanent institution, and the relevant clauses of the treaty have never yet been abrogated.

The railway zone system in Manchuria was introduced by the Russians, whose contract for the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1896 gave the company (actually controlled by the Russian government) 'absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands' with its own police force. Owing to the prevalence of brigandage in Manchuria soldiers were brought in to serve as police, so that the railway became in effect a ribbon of Russian territory across Manchuria. The same rights were obtained by Russia in 1898 for the branch from Harbin to Port Arthur, a section of which was transferred to Japan in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war and became the South Manchuria Railway; by the Treaty of Portsmouth the railway guards were limited to 15 per kilometre, but this was quite sufficient for a considerable force to be assembled anywhere along the line.

The semi-colonial servitudes on Chinese sovereignty were the result of China's failure to modernize her administrative and fiscal system during the second half of the nineteenth century. China retained enough strength and unity to survive as an independent state, but remained too weak and loosely organized either to give due protection to foreigners and their enterprises (which the official class in any case detested and had accepted only under *force majeure*) or to resist demands which were put to her on pretext of the disorderly conditions. The outcome of the long series of conflicts between the Western powers and the decaying Manchu-Chinese imperial régime was a compromise which made China a unique anomaly in international law, for, while continuing to hold rank as a sovereign state, she was deprived of the essential attributes of sovereignty inside her recog-

THE WESTERNERS

nized frontiers. With foreign garrisons quartered in her territory and two alien-ruled municipalities in the heart of her biggest city, China was not, even after the Washington Conference of 1922, in possession of full sovereign rights. Chinese nationalism was inevitably imbued with a resolve to get rid of the 'unequal treaties', but strong vested interests had come to be bound up with them, and the position was all the more difficult because certain of the privileges claimed by foreigners had long been conceded in practice without any real treaty basis.

Japan escaped from the servitudes imposed upon China by her rapid self-modernization after 1868. She was in the beginning subjected, like China, to a system of extra-territoriality, and in the period of her internal troubles in the 'sixties was widely expected to fall to pieces and be eaten up by Western imperialism much more easily than China. But, having equipped herself with an effectively centralized administration, a Western-model legal code and a competent army and navy, Japan avoided the régime of foreign garrisons and independent settlements, and secured the final abolition of extra-territoriality in 1901. Nor did she stop at her own emancipation; even before it was complete, she had joined the Western powers as a holder of extra-territorial rights on the mainland of Asia. The possession of such rights came to appear to the Japanese, from their own experience on the wrong side of it, to be the distinctive attribute of civilized states in relation to backward peoples, and its economic value was also appreciated. In Korea Japan was actually first in the field and secured a trade treaty with extra-territorial rights for her nationals in advance of any other nation. She obtained the same privileges in China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and thus entered the ranks of the Western powers who already held them. Under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 she shared with the Western powers the right of keeping garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area. By the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 she took over part of the system of rights previously extorted by the Russians in Manchuria, including the Kwantung Leased Territory and the

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railway to the north as far as Changchun with its privileges of administration and railway guards. In this way Japan gained a foothold inside China, and in the end the Western powers discovered that she was the principal beneficiary of a system they had originally elaborated for their own advantage.


Chapter IV

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

The Chinese empire, as constituted in the first decade of the present century, consisted of the eighteen provinces of China Proper and the four outer dependencies, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang or East Turkestan, and Tibet. China Proper comprised only 1,533,000 out of a total area of 4,278,000 square miles, but was estimated to contain well over 95 per cent of the total population.

This great empire was the creation of the Manchus, who captured Peking¹ in 1644 and set up the Ch'ing dynasty in China. The purely Chinese Ming dynasty, which had reigned from 1368 to 1644, had not held sway over north-west Manchuria, Mongolia, western Sinkiang or Tibet, though its territory in the time of its full vigour had extended north-westward by the Kansu corridor to Hami and north-eastward to the lower Amur and the Japan Sea north of Korea. Towards the end of the Ming period the Chinese were confined within the Great Wall, while the North-land passed under the domination of two barbaric powers: the Kalmuks and the Manchus. The former, whose homeland was in western Mongolia, were essentially nomadic; the latter, whose ascendancy was based on east-central Manchuria, combined shifting cultivation and horse-breeding with hunting in their economy, and were better able to amalgamate with the Chinese than the pure nomads. They conquered Liaoning province (Mukden and Dairen) before they penetrated into China Proper, and were affected culturally by the long-established

¹ Now Peiping. Peking means 'Northern Capital', and when it ceased to be the capital in 1928, its early name of Peiping was officially restored.



Ming Dynasty
1415 A.D.



Boundaries of
Manchu Empire
1912

1697


Year of
Acquisition
(by Manchus)

1895

Year of
Loss

7. CHINA UNDER THE MING AND MANCHU DYNASTIES



 Ming Dynasty
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 Boundaries of
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Loss

7. CHINA UNDER THE MING AND MANCHU DYNASTIES

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

tion, moreover, was not limited to China Proper, but extended also, and in an even greater degree, to the Manchu homeland. The Manchu tribesmen, a warlike but never numerous community, were distributed in garrisons over the empire, and Manchuria itself was left almost empty; the Manchu emperors, wishing to preserve it as an exclusive domain of their race, at first prohibited the immigration of Chinese, but the prohibition was later on relaxed, and in the late nineteenth century Chinese settlement was positively encouraged in order to create a human barrier against the flow of Russian colonization east of Lake Baikal. Manchuria thus became almost purely Chinese, except for the arid western tracts which were left to Mongol nomads, and the Manchus virtually disappeared as a distinct nationality with a territory of their own; formally, however, the administration of Manchuria, 'the three eastern provinces' (*tung san shêng*), was kept separate from that of China Proper, 'the eighteen provinces' (*shih pa shêng*), until 1907.

The order established by the Manchu empire also led to an extension of Chinese settlement in two other regions beyond the Great Wall: Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. In the former Chinese peasants encroached on cultivable steppe land at the expense of the Mongols' pastures, the government officials and Mongol princes finding profit for themselves in the process. In Sinkiang the settlement was more a matter of policy; colonies of Chinese and Manchus were planted, especially in the Kulja and Urumchi districts, to protect the western march of the empire, at first against the still unsubdued Kalmuks and later against Russia. In Tibet and Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, there was no Chinese colonization, and Chinese nationality was represented only by a handful of officials and traders.

Within China Proper there was evident throughout the period of the Manchu dynasty a deep cleavage between north and south in relation to the central government at Peking. In the words of a writer on Chinese history:¹ 'The Manchus occupied northern China by consent, unopposed; they conquered the

¹ C. P. Fitzgerald, *China: a Short Cultural History*, p. 535.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

south by force after a long and bitter struggle. This fact dominated the later history of the dynasty, and still to-day explains the differing attitude of the northern and southern Chinese towards the Manchu dynasty and the imperial system.¹

The hostility of the south towards the Manchu régime was further accentuated by the penetration of Western cultural influences into the south in advance of their extension to the north, contacts with foreigners being made not only through the ports open to foreign trade—of which Shanghai was the most northerly from 1842 to 1858—but also through Chinese emigration, which came mainly from Kwangtung to Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and America. The great T'ai P'ing rebellion, which broke out in 1851, was not only anti-Manchu, but also Christian; it began in Kwangsi, and its advance, first to Hankow and then down the Yangtse to Nanking, foreshadowed the later progress of the Kuomintang forces from Canton to the North China Plain. The T'ai P'ing rebellion was finally suppressed in 1864, but the cleavage between north and south was not overcome, and Canton subsequently became the focus of the revolutionary, modernizing, nationalist movement in China.¹

The T'ai P'ing rebels sought to supplant the Manchu dynasty, not to break up the unity of the empire; the Moslem rebellions which occurred during the same period threatened, however, the disruption of Chinese sovereignty. Independent kingdoms, which made appeals for British protection, were set up in Sinkiang and Yunnan, and the Russians took the opportunity to occupy Kulja and the Ili basin in 1871. But the Chinese in the end crushed the Moslem revolts and recovered Kulja by negotiation. The empire within the frontiers of 1860 was thus preserved intact until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 brought Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria into peril.

This war was fought on the issue of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, but military operations were also carried into southern Manchuria, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Liaotung

¹ The Cantonese did not support the T'ai P'ing movement, whose leader belonged to the distinct Hakka community of Kwangtung Chinese.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan. Russia, however, persuaded France and Germany to join her in compelling Japan by an ultimatum to restore this territory to China, and then took advantage of her position as China's protector to penetrate Manchuria herself. In 1898 she compelled China to grant her a lease of Port Arthur, which she proceeded to turn into a fortress and naval base; this stronghold together with the Russian-controlled railways gave the Russians paramount influence in Manchuria, and when in 1900 the Boxer anti-foreign outbreak was made the excuse for a general military occupation, the country passed completely under Russian dominion. The Russian rule was not destined to last long, for in 1904 Japan, covered against French or German intervention by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, made war on Russia and expelled her forces from Port Arthur and Mukden. This did not, however, result in a full restoration of Chinese sovereign control in Manchuria, for, though the Treaty of Portsmouth required a withdrawal of all troops, Russian or Japanese, outside the Kwantung Leased Territory (Port Arthur) and the railway zones, these corridors of foreign power remained, only they were now shared between Russia and Japan. Nor could China count after 1907 on the mutual hostility of Russia and Japan, for, having fought each other, they soon entered into close political collaboration, and by private arrangement between themselves partitioned all Chinese territory north of the Great Wall into 'spheres of influence'—Russia to have North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, while Japan reserved to herself South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

The Russian empire-building in Manchuria from 1896 to 1904 was supplemented by Russian intrigues in Tibet, which brought about British intervention and a military expedition to Lhasa in 1904, Chinese control of Tibet being at that time very slight. To reassert the authority of Peking a Chinese army was sent to Tibet in 1908 and had just succeeded in its task when the Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911.

After the fall of the Manchu dynasty the Chinese Republic



8. PROVINCES OF CHINA IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

was recognized internationally as inheriting all the territories of the old empire, but both the Tibetans and the Mongols of Outer Mongolia repudiated the Republic and took advantage of the confusion to gain *de facto* independence. The Republic adopted a flag with five bars to represent the five nationalities which were to form the new state—Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans, but the driving force in the new movement was pure Chinese nationalism, and it evoked strong resistance from the two most coherent of the non-Chinese nationalities of the empire—the Tibetans and the Mongols. Of the other two the Manchus, as already stated, had ceased to form a real nationality, while among the Moslems the great majority were Chinese-speaking (Tungans) and, with the modern nationalist stress on language rather than religion as the criterion of allegiance, tended to regard themselves primarily as Chinese in the new era; the Turki Moslems of Sinkiang were not strong enough by themselves to form an independent state.

A feature of the Republican régime has been the creation of new provinces assimilated to the administrative system of China Proper in those nearer parts of Tibet and Mongolia which remained under Chinese control. Sikang and Tsinghai were carved out of eastern Tibet, while Inner Mongolia was split up into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan and Ninghsia.

Apart from the Tibetan and Mongol secessions, however, there was a great disintegration of the Chinese state after 1915. The military governors of provinces engrossed the provincial revenues and made war on one another with private armies in the manner of feudal barons. Their insubordination was supported to some extent by the traditional particularism of Chinese provinces and their reluctance to submit to a centralized fiscal system, but in no case was there a real separatist movement aimed at setting up a new sovereign state. Among educated Chinese the consciousness of nationality was continually growing stronger, and the Kuomintang party with its headquarters at Canton was building up a powerful nationalist movement with a programme of 'rights recovery', 'abolition of

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

unequal treaties', state unification and economic self-development. Nevertheless, as long as the regional *tuchün* despotisms and civil wars continued, China was even weaker in relation to foreign powers than she had been under the Manchus, and her economic evolution was held up; the country's substance was devoured by unproductive spoliation and brigandage, and foreign capital did not dare to venture in under conditions of such disorder except where it was assured of political control.

At the Washington Conference in 1922 eight nations agreed with China in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty to 'provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government'. Such a prospect corresponded on the whole to the policies of Britain and the U.S.A., who took the lead at the Conference; a third signatory, however, was by no means of one mind with regard to the desirability of assisting the growth of a strong, united China. Influential official and business circles in Japan believed that their country had a vested interest in Chinese disunion, and that the unification and industrialization of China would spell Japan's political and economic decline. In particular they feared that a nationalist Chinese central government controlling Manchuria would soon make an end of the existing monopoly position of the South Manchuria Railway.

Chapter V


THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

In 1853, when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of Japan to foreign trade, Japan was almost completely secluded from the outer world and her dominion was confined to the four large islands from Kyushu to Yezo (Hokkaido).¹ She had no foothold on the mainland of Asia. To the south-west of Kyushu, the Ryukyu islands, which are now an integral part of Japan, then formed a separate kingdom which paid tribute to China, though also recognizing a certain suzerainty of the Japanese lords of Satsuma in Kyushu. To the north of Yezo Japanese fishermen and petty traders frequented the shores of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, but there was no Japanese administration. Yezo itself was scarcely Japanese except in the extreme south; most of it was wild forest country still left to the primitive Aino aborigines. Japan in effect consisted of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and the closely adjacent small islands.

Under the seclusionist system established early in the seventeenth century Japanese subjects were not allowed to go abroad, for trade or any other purpose, on pain of death if they returned; foreigners were not allowed in Japan except for a very limited trade, open only to the Chinese and Dutch, in the port of Nagasaki. From 1615 to 1853 Japan had no foreign war and no serious internal revolt; this period affords the most striking contrast to the stormy history of modern Japan.

Since prehistoric times (before A.D. 200) Japan has never been successfully invaded. The attempts made by Kublai Khan, the Mongol emperor of China, in the thirteenth century resulted in complete disaster, and the failure of what was then the strongest

¹ Hokkaido is really the name for an administrative division including Yezo and the Kuriles, but it has come to be used as a synonym for Yezo by itself.



9. IMPERIAL EXPANSION OF JAPAN

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

power in Asia to subdue the islands of the 'Yamato race' gave the Japanese a traditional confidence in the divinely assured inviolability of their country. The Kublai Khan invasion has the same place in Japanese, as the Spanish Armada in English, memory; the inscription 'He blew with His winds and they were scattered' on the pedestal of Drake's monument at Plymouth affords an exact counterpart to 'the divine wind of Ise', the typhoon which wrecked the fleet of China's overlord. This tradition of security goes far to explain the remarkable vigour of the national awakening when the Japanese in the eighteenth-fifties suddenly found their coasts and ports at the mercy of foreign warships.

Prior to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 the Japanese had twice in their history made temporary conquests on the Asiatic mainland. At an uncertain date sometime before A.D. 400 they penetrated into Korea, that country being at the time divided into several small kingdoms; in 663 they were finally expelled by an alliance of the Korean kingdom of Shinra with China, and Korea was united by Shinra under Chinese suzerainty. From 663 to 1592 there was no Japanese intervention in continental affairs, though the coasts of Kyushu were a base for corsairs who sorely harried the peoples of the mainland; then the great soldier Hideyoshi, having united Japan under his own rule (formally subject to the authority of the Mikado) after a long period of civil wars, designed the conquest of China and invaded Korea as a preliminary. After a campaign of varying fortunes the troops were withdrawn on the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, and the war came to be known as the *Ryo-to Ja-bi* or 'Dragon's head and snake's tail' because of its glorious beginning and inglorious ending. From 1598 no further attempt at continental expansion was made until after the 'westernization' of Japan.

With the entry of Japan into a world of international relations and modern navies the possession of outlying islands came to be of great importance, and it was to these that Japan's attention was first directed after the 'Restoration' of 1868. In 1875 a treaty was made with Russia whereby Russia acquired sovereignty

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

over Sakhalin and Japan over the Kuriles (Chishima). The Bonin islands (Ogasawarajima) to the south-east of Japan were formally annexed in 1876, and the Ryukyu islands (with a Japanese-speaking population) in 1879, China's claim to suzerainty over the latter being ignored.¹ The Kuriles, the Bonins and Ryukyu were incorporated in the administrative system of Japan Proper and are not to-day counted as colonial territories.

The acquisition of a definitely colonial domain began with the annexation of Taiwan (Formosa), which was ceded by China after the war of 1894-5. The Liaotung peninsula of southern Manchuria, which had been occupied by the Japanese army during the war, was also ceded by the same peace treaty, but was restored to China after the ultimatum known as the Triple Intervention, in which Russia, France and Germany participated. During the next few years it seemed likely that Russia would swallow up both Manchuria and Korea and exclude Japan from any possibility of expansion on the mainland, but the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 turned the tables and left Japanese forces in control of Korea, southern Manchuria and most of the island of Sakhalin. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the war, Russia ceded to Japan half of Sakhalin and the leasehold of Port Arthur and Dalny (Kwantung), which she had acquired from China; Korea, nominally a sovereign state since 1895, was placed under a thinly disguised Japanese protectorate and was finally annexed in 1910. At the time of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Japan thus held four colonial territories: Taiwan, Chosen (Korea), Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) and Kwantung, and as a result of the Great War she obtained a fifth—the island groups in the Pacific north of the Equator which had belonged to Germany. Of the five, three—Taiwan, Chosen and Karafuto—were under Japan's full sovereignty; in the other two her sovereignty was qualified, Kwantung being held on lease from China, and the ex-German islands under a mandate of the League of Nations.


¹ The former king of Ryukyu was given a title in the Japanese peerage.

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

Japan Proper has an area of 147,611 square miles (slightly larger than Great Britain, but smaller than any one of thirteen out of the eighteen provinces of China Proper) and a population of over 70 million. The Japanese in their islands form a very well-defined and compact nationality, and except for the negligible remnant of the Aino aborigines in Hokkaido (now only 20,000 strong) Japan has no domestic nationality problem. It should be remembered, however, in relation to internal politics, that although Japan is a small country inhabited by a single nationality, its surface is so much intersected by mountains as well as by the insular divisions that a very strong local particularism prevails, and 'county town' influences are an effective counterweight to the political activity of the big cities. London is not Britain and Paris is not France; it is even more true that Tokyo is not Japan, in spite of a centralized unitary system of administration. Up to seventy years ago Japan was divided into small feudal units, many of which were very loosely attached to the central power, and the old loyalties persist, so that Japanese opinion is formed no less in such places as Kagoshima, Saga and Kanazawa than in the capital, and the cliques in national politics often have narrowly local roots. The strong district attachments provide a framework for the separate life of rural Japan, industry being concentrated in a few restricted areas in the south-east of Honshu and the extreme north of Kyushu. The army in Japan specially represents the countryside, for most of the officers come from the small landowning gentry and the conscripts are selected as far as possible from peasant stock rather than from the town population.

The directly ruled colonies have a total population of about 30 million, of which less than 2 million are Japanese, the remainder being made up of about 22 million Koreans, 6 million Chinese in Formosa and Kwantung, and one to two hundred thousand Formosa aborigines and natives of the Mandated Islands.

These colonial territories acquired up to 1931 were all of some value, but they did not give Japan in the long run a strong




10. MINERALS IN JAPAN AND KOREA

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN



economic position either for commercial competition in a world of increasing economic nationalism or for war-power under conditions of strategy in which military decision was tending more and more to depend on capacity for avoiding economic breakdown in time of war. Japan and Korea were more or less self-sufficing as regards foodstuffs, and Formosa on the edge of the tropics supplemented their resources with sugar, citrus fruits and other special products. In minerals, however, and in the raw materials of several of her most important industries Japan remained largely or entirely dependent on imports for essential supplies. Japan is not rich in any important mineral except copper; her resources of coal are small, of iron ore insignificant, and of oil negligible, for a country which aims at large-scale industrial development. Good coking coal is conspicuous by its absence. For textile industries cotton must be entirely, and wool almost entirely, imported; the rayon industry is also mainly dependent on wood-pulp imports.

To create big industries and support a large population by the export of manufactured goods with so inadequate a basis of natural resources would be a formidable task even in a world of free trade, stable currencies and general political harmony. Under the conditions prevailing in the world since 1919, and still more since 1930, industrialization involved Japan in very serious difficulties, and the most disconcerting factor in the situation was the prospect of the competitive industrialization of China. For China not only has five times the population of Japan, but is far better endowed with natural resources and capacity for raw-material production, especially as regards coal, iron and cotton. If China and Japan had begun their self-modernization simultaneously about 1870 and had continued at the same rate, there can be no doubt but that by 1931 China would have become the Great Power of the Far East, both economically and politically, and that Japan would have remained a mainly agricultural country and a power of secondary rank, comparing with China in much the same way as Holland or Sweden with Britain or Germany. But China's late start gave Japan a long lead both



JAPAN : TRADE 1936

GB : GREAT BRITAIN
USA : UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MAN : MANCHURIA & KWANTUNG
CH : CHINA & HONGKONG
NI : NETHERLAND INDIES
PH : PHILIPPINES




II. JAPANESE TRADE 1936

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in economic development and military power, and Japan was determined to retain it.

Hence the 'positive' policy towards China, which meant, in short, to keep China weak and divided, to prevent a Kuomintang-directed, anti-Japanese industrialization of China, and to control the raw material resources of the country for Japan's own use in peace or war.

Japanese liberals during the nineteen-twenties believed that a satisfactory compromise was possible, and they might have reached an understanding with the new China but for the fundamental conflict over Japan's vested interests in South Manchuria—interests which were based on the political supremacy taken over from Russia in 1905 and were regarded by Chinese nationalists as incompatible with China's sovereignty. The conflict reached a climax in 1931, at a time when Japan was in the throes of a serious internal crisis due to the effects of a world-wide economic depression, and the army chiefs took the opportunity to launch Japan on a new era of imperialist expansion. The military occupation of Manchuria not only secured the vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway but delivered all the resources of four Chinese provinces into the hands of Japan. Some Japanese leaders hoped to close the account with the completion of this conquest. There could, however, be no stopping at the borders of Manchuria. China now became implacably hostile and acquired a new political unity and energy from the principle of 'anti-Japanism'; her capacity for economic development was not seriously impaired by the loss of Manchuria, for her most important economic areas lay south of the Great Wall. In 1935 China reformed her currency with British financial support and advice, and at the beginning of 1937, as a result of the Sian kidnapping incident, the civil war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists was brought to an end and replaced by an anti-Japanese People's Front. Meanwhile the tariff and quota restrictions on Japanese export trade and exchange difficulties due to inflationary finance had combined to convert Japanese business circles to a programme



12. JAPANESE TRADE EXPANSION 1926-36

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

of obtaining economic control over the raw-material resources of North China; the fighting services favoured the same policy as a means of both forestalling the growth of China's war-power and strengthening their own. In these circumstances, after four years of uneasy truce, the war against China was renewed at the end of July 1937.

The campaign in Manchuria in 1931-33 had already involved Japan in conflict with other Great Powers. The League of Nations had condemned Japan's action and bound its States Members not to recognize the new state of 'Manchukuo'; the U.S.A. had likewise pledged itself to a policy of non-recognition. The U.S.S.R., whose interests were the most seriously affected by the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, adopted an attitude of sullen hostility towards Japan. This diplomatic isolation, however, did not, in the absence of effective measures of coercion, have the effect of moderating Japan's outlook and policy; on the contrary it produced in Japan a mood of truculent self-reliance and strengthened the hold of military chauvinism on the Japanese people. In so far as Japan sought to emerge from her isolation, it was not by withdrawing from Manchuria and seeking re-entry to the League of Nations, but by concluding in the autumn of 1936 the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, an agreement which bore the obvious character of an alliance against the U.S.S.R. When Japan began her new war in China in the summer of 1937, she had to contend with the non-belligerent antagonism of the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States and an unfriendly attitude even on the part of Germany, whose interests in China were adversely affected by the Japanese invasion. None of this opposition, however, was strong enough to be an effective deterrent. Britain and the U.S.S.R. were too much pre-occupied with European affairs or with internal troubles to be willing to take the risks of active intervention in the Far East; the pro-Chinese policy of the U.S.A. was rendered innocuous to Japan partly by Isolationist sentiment in America and partly by the vested interests of American-Japanese trade. Germany was compelled to subordinate her Chinese interests to

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

the general needs of her *Weltpolitik* and withdrew her military mission from China in the summer of 1938. Japan was thus able to forge ahead with what she called the 'China Affair', though China continued to resist and received a degree of moral and material support from the U.S.S.R., Britain and America.

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 produced a new situation for Japan. The conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact alienated Japan from Germany for the time being, while the preoccupation of Britain and France with their war against Germany seemed to afford an opportunity for Japanese diplomacy to obtain from them a ban on war material supplies to China through their territories. Japanese policy, therefore, adopted the slogan of 'disposal of the China Affair and non-involvement in the European war', but had achieved no concrete results by it up to July 1940. By then France had collapsed, Holland had been overrun by Germany, and Britain was threatened with invasion. In these circumstances Japan changed her policy to one of menaces and concluded a conditional military alliance with Germany and Italy. France agreed to close the Haiphong-Kunming railway to supplies for China and to grant Japan air bases in Tongking for use against China; Britain agreed to close the Burma Road for three months. But the attitude of the U.S.A. only became more uncompromising in consequence of the Tripartite Pact, Britain reopened the Burma Road in October, and China continued to refuse to negotiate with Japan except after an unconditional withdrawal of Japanese forces from Chinese territory. The only clear gain for Japan in 1940 was in Indo-China; here Japan acquired, without firing a shot, an increasing degree of control over a rich colonial territory in addition to cutting off China's most important remaining route for imports from the outer world.

From the autumn of 1940 Japanese policy showed marked signs of indecision. A small, though very active, political group urged conquest in the South Seas as an end in itself and participation in the European war on the side of the Axis, while the

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

Army and Navy Staffs worked out provisional plans for a war against Britain and the U.S.A. But the ruling Konoye clique appears to have intended to avoid a major war and to have hoped to settle the 'China Affair' by a compromise based on an understanding with the U.S.A. There was no need for a final decision between peace and war as long as Britain and the U.S.A. continued to sell war materials to Japan as well as to China. Konoye, however, made the mistake of supposing that Japan could complete the absorption of Indo-China without provoking an irrevocable breach with Washington. The dispatch of troops to southern Indo-China in July, 1941, put Japan within striking distance of Siam, Malaya and Borneo in addition to tightening her grip on the French administration in Indo-China. The U.S.A., Britain and Holland decided to regard this move as a mortal challenge and took steps to cut off all economic relations of their territories with Japan. In the subsequent negotiations with the U.S.A. Japan offered to evacuate southern Indo-China in return for a raising of the embargoes and the abandonment by the U.S.A. of all help for China; this was clearly unacceptable. Japan was, however, under the pressure of an economic blockade which would have drained her power to zero in less than two years of non-belligerent attrition, and she had to choose between capitulation and armed attack on the blockaders. In the actual circumstances of Japan's internal politics and external commitments it was only possible for her to choose the latter course. The war in China had already cost fully a million casualties and no Japanese Government could have renounced all the gains of that war in submission to Anglo-American economic blockade without an appeal to arms. So Konoye, his policy having failed, was compelled to resign and General Tojo, the War Minister, took his place while remaining on the active list of the Army, a change which signified that the Army had assumed full responsibility for national policy. Within two months of Konoye's fall Japanese torpedo-bombers descended on Pearl Harbour.

Chapter VI

SOVIET SIBERIA

The territories of the Soviet Union stretch to the north-west, north and north-east of both China and Japan—Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka is nearly 20 degrees of longitude east of Tokyo—and in Far Eastern politics the Russian power established between Lake Baikal and the Pacific stands at the apex of the triangle of which China and Japan form the base. The obvious strategic importance of East Siberia, however, and its vast size on the map do not at all correspond to its significance in the economy of the Soviet Union. It is by far the poorest both actually and potentially (on known data) of the main regions of the Union, and if all territory east of the Yenisei were to be eliminated to-morrow, the Soviet economic system would hardly be affected by the loss, except perhaps as regards gold-mining and the fur trade.

The economic power of the Soviet Union and its future prospects in world affairs are based on its enormous natural resources in soil and minerals. The great belt of *chernozym* or 'black earth' soil from the Dniester to the Yenisei provides the possibility of an abundant agricultural production, while enormous reserves of coal and iron ore in European Russia and West Siberia afford an adequate foundation for a heavy industry on the largest scale. Add to these assets the oil of the Caucasus, the copper and cotton of Turkestan, the timber of the north, the broad cattle and sheep pastures of the steppe margins and the fact that Russia is all plain, except for the Urals, from the Baltic to the Altai, and the whole of that area is seen to form a grand economic unit of prodigious natural wealth. But East Siberia falls outside that area and forms a separate region in no way comparable in natural resources. It has virtually no black-earth

SOVIET SIBERIA


soil and very little cultivable land; it is in great part as mountainous as it is barren; except for gold, deposits of which are found mainly in the Lena basin, it has no mineral wealth remotely comparable to that of European Russia or West Siberia; communications are inadequate for such resources as there are and can only be developed at great expense.¹ The principal maritime outlet, Vladivostok, does not find a place in the first rank of Far Eastern ports in respect of tonnage cleared. In a process of normal economic development East Siberia would remain a region of 'bad lands' like northern Canada, productive of gold and furs with a supplement of lumber and fisheries, but a mere appendage to the main economy of the Soviet Union. Its recent development, under the direction of central government planning, has been highly artificial and dominated by strategic-political considerations, which require the existence of an agricultural and coal-metal base to support Soviet military power in the Far East.

In 1931 the population of East Siberia, including considerable territory to the west of the Yenisei, was as follows:

Far Eastern Region (of R.S.F.S.R.)	-	-	1,593,400
Yakut Republic	-	-	308,400
Buryat-Mongol Republic	-	-	575,000
East Siberian Region (of R.S.F.S.R.)	-	-	<u>2,568,400</u>
<i>Total</i>	-	-	5,045,200

A population of rather over 5 millions in this vast area—and it has not greatly increased since 1931—is little enough in comparison with over 400 millions in China and nearly 100 millions in Japan and Korea. Moreover, it has not been attained without great efforts to promote colonization, begun by the Tsarist government after the Russo-Japanese war, when the emptiness of East Siberia was revealed as a great handicap on the Russian army operating in Manchuria. Soviet policy has sought to induce settlers to come east of Lake Baikal—and stay there—by drastic exemptions from taxation; another device has been the

¹ Gold and furs from Yakutia are at present transported mainly by air.




13. EAST SIBERIA: RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES

SOVIET SIBERIA

founding of the autonomous area of Biro-Bijan as a colony for Jews in the country north of the Amur. Labour for road and railway construction has been supplied in recent years by convicts, who were available in large quantities after the liquidation of the kulaks under the First Five-Year Plan. By special inducements to some and coercion for others the Soviet government has thus during the last decade assembled in East Siberia a greater number of Russians than would otherwise have gone there, but the total effect on the wilderness has not been very great, and the Soviet Far Eastern army still relies less on local agriculture and industries than on its magazines and its railway communications with the west.

The Trans-Siberian railway has lately been double-tracked and this has vastly increased its efficiency as a route of supply. Now that the Manchurian section of the direct Chita-Vladivostok line (the old Chinese Eastern Railway) has been sold to 'Manchukuo' and would be held by Japan in case of war, the only line to Vladivostok is that by Khabarovsk, going to the north of the Amur. This railway keeps well behind the frontier, but it might be cut by a rapid offensive from Manchuria, or the Trans-Siberian might be cut to the south of Lake Baikal by a Japanese advance through Outer Mongolia; against these risks the U.S.S.R. has planned a second line of defence based on a railway to the north of Lake Baikal, which has been under construction during the last few years. The terminus of this line is the new town of Soviet Haven on the coast north of Vladivostok.

In spite of the general indigence of East Siberia, it has two assets which are of considerable significance for Japan's economic system. Marine products play an exceptionally large part in Japanese food consumption and some of the best fishing grounds within convenient range of Japan are inside, or just outside, Russian territorial waters in the Gulf of Tartary and off the west coast of Kamchatka. The Russians have made hitherto comparatively little use of these fisheries and their exploitation by Japanese fishing fleets has long been a source of friction, acrimonious discussion and hard bargaining between the two governments. The



14. EAST SIBERIA: COMMUNICATIONS

SOVIET SIBERIA

second bone of contention has been the Sakhalin oilfield, which lies entirely in the northern, i.e. the Russian, half of the island. The oilfield was not known to exist in 1905, or the Japanese would not have agreed to the partition of Sakhalin as readily as they did in the settlement after the Russo-Japanese war. The oilfield is the only considerable source of natural oil in the Far East north of Borneo and was, therefore, of very great importance to Japan in the days before she had seized the oil supplies of the Dutch East Indies; even now it is valuable because of its proximity to Japanese ports. Since 1925 a Japanese company has therefore worked the Sakhalin field with a concession on the checkerboard system, most of the output being taken up by the Navy. For Japanese to carry on such an enterprise on Soviet territory under Soviet law, with Soviet-Japanese relations as they have been in recent years, has not been an easy matter and there has been much bickering, but production was never stopped entirely even when Russians and Japanese were fighting battles on the Mongolian border.

It has been well said that the Soviet Far Eastern Region is worth having, but not worth a major war. There have been two occasions, however, within the last twenty years when it appeared for a while that the Russian Far East might be overrun without a major war. The first was at the time of the civil wars in Siberia just after the Russian Revolution. Japan then sent troops to Siberia along with British, French and American contingents as part of the Allied intervention on behalf of the Czechoslovak legionaries in 1918. As the intervention developed into support of the Russian counter-revolution, the Japanese evolved a policy designed to give them a protectorate over Transbaikalia and the Maritime Province; they backed, not the would-be central government of Admiral Kolchak, but the Cossack adventurers Semenov and Kalmikov, who fought, each for his own hand, in East Siberia. The project failed, partly because of the solidarity of Russian national feeling against the Japanese and their protégés, partly because the Japanese military forces at that time lacked sufficient warm clothing to enable them to remain in the

SOVIET SIBERIA

field during the Siberian winter in more than fifty degrees of frost. There was a lack of enthusiasm for the campaign in Japan, and the U.S.A. applied pressure for withdrawal. Finally, the Japanese evacuated Vladivostok in the autumn of 1922; they stayed in the Russian half of Sakhalin until 1925, and secured the oilfield concession already mentioned in consideration of their departure.

When the Russians started to develop Vladivostok as an air base, Japanese army leaders began to think the place had been too lightly given up, and another opportunity to lay hold on the Maritime Province seemed to offer itself in 1932. When the Kwantung army took the offensive in southern Manchuria in September 1931, the Soviet Union was just entering on the critical period of the First Five-Year Plan and was incapable of any vigorous action externally; the Japanese, therefore, in confidence of immunity from Russian intervention in Manchuria, followed up their initial drive in their own railway sphere with an advance across the zone of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway and up to the Amur. They thus placed themselves astride the principal line of communication with Vladivostok, and a policy group in the army advocated the seizure of all Soviet territory south of the Amur by a rapid offensive while the going was good. However, the fighting which broke out at Shanghai early in 1932 not only diverted Japan's attention elsewhere, but brought her into a position of such diplomatic isolation that a further military adventure was out of the question. The military party therefore contented itself with the elimination of Soviet interests and influence from Manchuria, which was a solid achievement and greatly strengthened Japan's strategic position.

After 1933 the Japanese threat to the U.S.S.R. was no longer so much direct as indirect; it arose particularly out of Japanese attempts to penetrate Mongolia. In that period, when the most reckless of Japanese expansionists hardly thought of the conquest of Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies as a practical proposition and even Central and South China were considered

SOVIET SIBERIA

better left alone for fear of complications with Britain and the U.S.A., the favourite scheme of the Japanese empire-builders was a sphere comprising all Manchuria and Mongolia as far as the Altai and the provinces of China Proper north of the Yellow River. The creation of such a sphere need not have involved any direct encroachment on the territory of the U.S.S.R., but it would have been disastrous strategically for the U.S.S.R., as it would have put Japan in a position to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway at its loop to the south of Lake Baikal and thus virtually isolate not only the Maritime Province, but also the whole of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. The U.S.S.R., therefore, vigorously resisted the Japanese advance into Mongolia and publicly concluded, over China's formal protest, a military alliance with the Mongol People's Republic.

In November, 1936, Japan and Germany made the treaty known as the Anti-Comintern Pact. In form this was directed against the Comintern, not against the U.S.S.R. and the latter could not complain, as she had always maintained that the Comintern had no connection with the Soviet Government. But it was widely believed that the Pact covered a secret military alliance against the U.S.S.R. The diversion of Japanese attention and energy to China after July 1937 reduced the danger to the U.S.S.R. for the time being, but increased it as a long-term strategic threat, because the Japanese at once seized the whole length of the Peking-Kalgan-Paotou railway and thus gained a line of bases for invading Outer Mongolia from the south as well as from Manchuria. Only in the spring of 1941, with tension rapidly increasing between the U.S.S.R. and Germany on the one hand and between Japan and the U.S.A. on the other, did tension really relax between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Then, on the 17th April, a Neutrality Pact was concluded in Moscow: this treaty, as was said at the time, enabled the two countries to turn their backs on each other.

Since then Japan has gone to war with the U.S.A., and Russia, in accordance with her pact, has so far remained neutral. This neutrality may at any time be brought to an end either by

SOVIET SIBERIA


a Japanese aggression against Siberia or by Russian intervention in the war against Japan. The neutrality is a heavily armed one, as both sides keep armies ready for action facing each other along the devious frontier from the Tumen estuary to the sand dunes of the Gobi. This front is still the 'gap' in the alignment of the two great warring coalitions to which Japan and the U.S.S.R. respectively belong; up to the time of writing both nations have been anxious to avoid a two-front war. But now that Japan has completed her southward conquests as far as Burma and New Guinea, it will be strange if her thoughts do not turn back to the 450-mile space of the 'Sea of Japan' which separates Niigata from Russian Vladivostok.

Chapter VII

MANCHURIA

The territory of the state of 'Manchukuo', created by the agency of Japanese military power in 1932, comprises the former Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol. The first three of these were known to the Chinese as 'the Three Eastern Provinces' and made up the area known to foreigners as Manchuria; Jehol was reckoned a part of Inner Mongolia. All four, however, prior to the Japanese conquest were under the control of the military despotism established in the years following the Chinese Revolution by the adventurer Chang Tso-lin and inherited in 1928 by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang.

Manchuria is geographically separated from China Proper by the inner gulf of the Yellow Sea and by the mountains which shut in the North China plain and extend to the coast at Shan-haikwan. The Great Wall follows the line of these mountains and was designed to keep the passes by which barbarian raiders from Manchuria and Mongolia broke into the lowlands of Hopei; it never formed, however, an absolute limit to Chinese settlement, and for the last two thousand years the northern shore of the Yellow Sea with the hinterland as far as Mukden has been inhabited by Chinese. The northern and central parts of Manchuria, on the other hand, remained up to the nineteenth century in the hands of primitive tribes of Mongol or Tungusic speech; sometimes a strong Chinese dynasty would reduce them to subjection, but more often the tribes would form a conquering confederacy or kingdom and bring the Chinese pale under their yoke. Manchuria was thus a country which always contained a strong Chinese element, but still remained a 'frontier' and never became part of the Chinese homeland until quite recently.



- | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Chinese Eastern Railway | Japanese Railways | State Boundaries |
| South Manchurian " | Russian " | |
| Chinese Railways | Rivers | |

15. MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS 1931

MANCHURIA

To the west Manchuria merges into Mongolia without any very clear definition. The Great Khingan mountains, forming the eastern escarpment of the Mongolian plateau, are to some extent a dividing line, but the Barga district of Heilungkiang lies to the west of the range, while the arid steppe country typical of Mongolia is continued in a large tract to the east of it. Ethnically also the Mongols overflow to the east of the Great Khingan. Broadly speaking, however, there is a strong contrast between the two regions, in that most of Manchuria is arable and well provided with rivers, whereas most of Mongolia is riverless and too arid for cultivation.

It has already been pointed out (Chap. IV) that, as an ultimate result of the Manchu conquest of China, Manchuria became more Chinese than ever before; that the country fell virtually under Russian rule from 1900 to 1904; and that Chinese sovereignty was only imperfectly restored after the Russo-Japanese war. The seeds which came to harvest in 1931 were sown by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Manchuria was recognized as Chinese territory under Chinese administration, but the Russian railway system with its military guards and its 'absolute and exclusive administration of its lands' remained, only it was now shared between Russia and Japan. Russia retained the continuation of the Trans-Siberian Railway across North Manchuria (known as the Chinese Eastern Railway—C.E.R.) and the branch from Harbin to the Yellow Sea as far south as Changchun (now Hsinking), while Japan took over the section from Changchun to the port of Dalny (now Dairen). The Japanese line was given the name of the South Manchuria Railway (S.M.R.); it was operated by a company in which the Japanese government owned half the shares and appointed to the highest posts, while the other half of the shares were held mainly by a ring of the biggest family trusts—the so-called *Zaibatsu*. The C.E.R. was always before 1917 under the control of the Russian Ministry of Finance, and from 1924 to 1935 it was the Soviet government which inherited in a modified form the rights of the former Russian company. Both Japan and

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Russia were therefore deeply involved as states in the affairs of the Manchurian railways, and every transaction of the railway companies tended to become a political issue.

By the treaties and notes of 1915, imposed on China in sequel to the famous 'Twenty-one Demands', the terms of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory and of the S.M.R. and Antung-Mukden Railway¹ were extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years from the original dates. Because of the duress under which the concessions were made, the Chinese, in the words of the Lytton Report,² 'continuously denied that these [the 1915 treaties and notes] were binding upon them'. They demanded the abrogation of the 1915 agreements at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at the Washington Conference in 1921-2, and in a note to Japan in 1923; they maintained, as German nationalists held with regard to the Versailles 'Diktat', that the treaties lacked 'fundamental validity' and so—again to quote the Lytton Report—'they declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except in so far as circumstances made it expedient to do so'. Circumstances meant, in the first place, the Japanese military units stationed in Kwantung and along the S.M.R. as 'railway guards'—a force under a separate command known as the Kwantung Army.

The C.E.R. was less obnoxious to Chinese nationalists than the S.M.R., but it also was a cause of trouble, especially after the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists in China in 1927. There were no longer any Russian railway guards on the C.E.R. after 1917, and under the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 the Chinese participated in the operation of the line. The Russians, however, retained an effective control and made a political use of it, as in 1925, when they supported the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin against the Manchurian government of Chang Tso-lin.

After Manchuria's acknowledgement of the Nanking govern-

¹ The Antung-Mukden line linked the S.M.R. with the Japanese railway system in Korea.

² *Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry*, Geneva, 1932, pp. 49-50.

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ment (controlled by the Kuomintang or 'Nationalist' party) as the central government of China, the conflicts of Manchurian railway politics came to a head in the two armed clashes of 1929 and 1931. In the first of these crises the Manchurian Chinese authorities seized the C.E.R. properties, alleging the use of the company offices for Communist propaganda; the Soviet Union responded by concentrating an army on the Manchurian border, invading Manchuria, and compelling the Chinese to restore the *status quo ante* on the railway. The violence in 1931 was wider in scope because the threat to the S.M.R. came, not from direct action, as in the case of the C.E.R., but from a system of Chinese-operated lines designed with the aid of through-traffic arrangements and rate-cutting to divert trade from the S.M.R. and Dairen to a Chinese port—Yingkow (Newchwang) or Hulutao on the Gulf of Liaotung.¹ Up to 1929 the S.M.R. had earned monopoly profits from the economic development of South Manchuria, but from that year the intensive state-organized competition of the Chinese lines began to make big inroads on the profitability of the Japanese system and produced a strong demand for a 'positive policy' in Japanese financial circles. The result was the campaign of the Kwantung Army beginning with 'the Incident' of 18 September 1931. At the outset Japanese official and public opinion was divided as to the aims of policy to be pursued in Manchuria, and a compromise settlement with the existing Manchurian authorities, preserving at least the nominal sovereignty of China, was possible up to the end of the year. But the exaltation of easy military success, the growth of a reactionary chauvinist movement inside Japan, and anger at the Chinese refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations² combined to

¹ Some of the Chinese lines had been financed by the S.M.R. as 'feeders', but, having been linked up in the Chinese system, reduced instead of increasing its traffic. The Ssupingkai-Anganchi and Mukden-Kirin were tapped by the Peking-Mukden and Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan lines.

² The Soviet Union, not being a member of the League of Nations in 1929, insisted on bilateral negotiations and declined to admit any kind of mediation. In 1931 China appealed to the League, and Japan, as a member, could not refuse to plead, though she subsequently disregarded the League's verdict.

MANCHURIA

persuade the rulers of Japan to adopt the policy of setting up a separate sovereign state under Japanese military protection in Manchuria.

A number of more or less eminent Chinese of Manchuria and certain Mongol princes lent themselves to this scheme, and a Declaration of Independence was published by them on 18 February 1932; the new state, having taken over the civil administration with the assistance of Japanese advisers, was recognized *de jure* by Japan six months later. Recognition was accompanied by a treaty which empowered Japan to station troops throughout the country for the defence of its newly established sovereignty; the Kwantung Army, which had brought 'Manchukuo' into being, thus obtained the right of permanent occupation.

'Manchukuo' is provided with a monarchy and Chinese ministers and officials, the throne being held by the heir of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty overthrown in China by the revolution of 1911. The substance of power, however, belongs to the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung army, who is also Japanese ambassador to 'Manchukuo', and thus performs the function of a resident or high commissioner in a protectorate. He resides at Hsinking, formerly Changchun, which is now both the capital of 'Manchukuo' and the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. The central administration of Manchuria was removed from Mukden to Changchun to mark the change of régime, and the latter was almost entirely rebuilt to give it the aspect and facilities of a capital city; at the same time the four old provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were split up to make new divisions with new names, so that the political map of the country has been quite transformed since 1931 (see map 18).


By the action of 1931 the Japanese not only averted the danger to the S.M.R. from politically promoted Chinese competition, but were able themselves to obtain control of the Chinese-operated railways and unite them with the S.M.R. in a single system. Nor was the victory of the S.M.R. restricted to its former domain in South Manchuria. Just two months after the Mukden inci-

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dent a Japanese column occupied Tsitsihar in Heilungkiang, thus cutting across the Soviet-controlled C.E.R. The Soviet Union, paralysed for the time being by the stresses of the first Five-year Plan, could not risk military counter-measures, and remained passive while the Kwantung Army took possession of North Manchuria up to the Amur. The potential strategic value of the C.E.R. as a short cut to Vladivostok having been destroyed by this Japanese advance, the Soviet government decided to cut its losses, and finally sold its interest in the C.E.R. to 'Manchukuo' in 1935.

With the acquisition of the C.E.R. all the railways of Manchuria came under a unified Japanese management. There was in 1931 a total railway mileage of 4,000; over 2,000 miles of new lines have been constructed since then by the Japanese. Three of the new railways have special strategic, as well as economic, significance. One continues the Dairen-Harbin line north to Heiho on the Amur opposite the Russian town of Blagoveshchensk; a second supplements the old Peking-Mukden line by an inland route *via* Jehol (completed early in 1938); and a third runs from Rashin on the Korean coast a little way south of the Siberian border to Hsinking, with branches north to Harbin and to Sanchiang province, thus giving Japan railway access to Manchuria from the Japan Sea as well as from the Yellow Sea.

Before 1931 Japan had land frontiers with the Soviet Union only in Karafuto and for a very short stretch in the extreme north-east of Korea. With the conquest of Manchuria she took over 1,500 miles of China's Siberian boundary, and the fact that this boundary had never been precisely demarcated gave plenty of opportunity for border incidents between the armed forces of two Great Powers on very bad terms with each other. The greater part of the frontier was formed by the Amur and Ussuri rivers, but even in the river sections there were islands in dispute, and at each end, near the Japan Sea in the east and towards the edge of Mongolia in the west, there were no rivers to separate the Japanese and Russian outposts. In these circum-




16. MANCHURIA AND JEHO (MANCHUKUO): RAILWAYS 1938

NOTE ON MAP 17

Vladivostok was founded on an uninhabited site in 1860; Rashin has been developed from a fishing village into a major port within the last nine years. Between Yuki and Kunju the railway from Rashin into Manchuria runs close to the south-western extremity of Soviet territory. Serious fighting took place for ten days from 29 July 1938 over rival claims to the hill of Changkufeng between the Tumen river and Lake Khasan. The Russians claimed that the map attached to a Russo-Chinese border-demarcation treaty of 1886 showed that the hill belonged to them, though it is not apparently marked by name on this map; the Japanese protested that this map was never communicated to Japan with other Russo-Chinese secret agreements at the time of the *entente* of 1911 and that maps prepared by the Russian Imperial General Staff left the hill on the Chinese side of the frontier.

The railways from Seishin and Rashin are of great importance to Japan as short cuts into Manchuria from the Japan Sea; communications with Manchuria otherwise are only through Fusan and western Korea or through Dairen.



17. VLADIVOSTOK AND RASHIN

MANCHURIA

stances skirmishes have been frequent during the last few years and they have served as trials of strength, willingness to risk general hostilities being measured by truculence of attitude in each case. In June 1937 a fight broke out over possession of an island in the Amur and the Russians withdrew after losing a gunboat sunk by shell fire; this was soon after the execution of Tukhachevsky and other Red Army generals in Moscow, and the Japanese army leaders were encouraged by the exhibition of Russian weakness to bring matters to a head in North China. In 1938, however, there was renewed tension on the Manchuria border when a dispute arose over the possession of a hill called Changkufeng at the point where the tongue of Soviet territory along the coast south-west of Vladivostok approaches Japan's new artery of communication with Manchuria, the Rashin-Harbin railway. A battle took place on a four-mile front lasting for several days without any general hostilities and was concluded by an armistice with each army staying on the ground it held—which was slightly to the advantage of the Russians. Next year fighting of much greater duration and on a much larger scale broke out on the other side of Manchuria, in the Nomonhan district to the south-east of Lake Buir Nor, where the territory of Outer Mongolia forms a salient between the 'Manchukuo' province of North Hsingan and the Inner Mongolian province of Chahar. The clash arose over a question of the location of the frontier, and the battle was fought out against Mongol and Soviet Russian forces with aircraft, tanks and artillery; the Japanese afterwards admitted losses of 18,000 men. Even so, there was no general warfare between Japan and the U.S.S.R. The Japanese were driven back by strong Russian tank formations; in the middle of September, however, with the crisis caused by the German invasion of Poland calling for Russian attention in Europe, an armistice was suddenly arranged and no further fighting took place. After apparently interminable negotiations agreement on the line of the frontier was at last reached in August 1941, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war.


MANCHURIA

The Kwantung Army has a scheme for settling Japanese emigrants, mostly ex-service men, in the provinces of Heiho and Sanchiang near the Amur; there is still much unoccupied land in the far north of Manchuria, and it is here that there is most need for a co-national rural population to support the military garrisons. The scheme provides for the settlement of a million families in twenty years from 1936. So far Japanese colonization in these regions has not prospered, for the conditions of life are very different from those in Japan; the settlers who have done best are those from the Hokkaido, where American methods of large-scale farming have been introduced.


As yet only about ten per cent of the population of Manchukuo is to be found in the northern half of the country. Economic life is still concentrated in the south near the Yellow Sea. Here is not only the richest and most closely settled agricultural land, with wheat and soya beans as its main products, but also the Mukden industrial area based on the coal and iron ore of Fengtien province. The centre of coal production is at Fushun, a little way to the east of Mukden; to the south is Anshan, site of the Showa Steel Works, now Japan's largest heavy industrial plant. The development of this industrial area under complete Japanese control has undoubtedly strengthened Japan both from an economic and from a military point of view. Fengtien heavy industry is, however, subject to certain drawbacks which cannot be eliminated either by political control or administrative energy. Manchuria has large coal reserves, but is deficient in good coking coal for metallurgical purposes, and its abundant iron ore is almost everywhere of low grade and costly to work. Good coking coal, on the other hand, is produced in Hopei and Shantung in North China, and fairly large reserves of high-grade iron ore exist in Chahar to the west of Jehol. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria thus left China still with a great potential advantage in heavy industry and all it implies, if she were to undertake seriously the exploitation of her coal and iron resources. Such considerations counted for much in persuading the Kwantung Army to extend the 'manifest destiny' from

MANCHURIA


Manchuria to Inner Mongolia and North China. Moreover Manchuria could not meet Japan's need for oil; except for some shale oil deposits of limited value it has no natural oilfield, and for self-supply in petrol Japan had to look beyond both Manchuria and China to the islands of the South Seas.



Density of population per sq. mile



Coal and Iron



18. MANCHURIA: COAL, IRON AND DENSITY OF POPULATION

Chapter VIII


MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

Mongolia and Sinkiang under the Manchu empire together comprised an area about eighteen times that of Great Britain with a total population of perhaps five millions. Since the Chinese Revolution the landmarks of this vast region have been considerably altered, for the old Mongolia has been broken up by the constitution in Outer Mongolia (north of the Gobi desert) of the two independent republics of Mongolia¹ and Tannu-Tuva, and in Inner Mongolia (south of the Gobi) of the four Chinese provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan and Ninghsia. Chinese colonization in the four Inner Mongolian provinces has greatly increased their population during the last twenty-five years, so that it now stands at over seven millions, while Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang contain together about five million inhabitants. Chinese form a numerical majority in the Inner Mongolian provinces, but are in a minority in Sinkiang and are a negligible element in Outer Mongolia.

Politically the Mongolia-Sinkiang region is now divided *de facto* between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. China continues to hold, subject to considerable insubordination of the provincial governors, Ninghsia and Sinkiang. Japan incorporated Jehol in 'Manchukuo' in 1933, and has overrun Chahar and part of Suiyüan since 1937, setting up an 'autonomous' Mongol state to the south-west of 'Manchukuo'. The Soviet Union holds under a kind of protectorate Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, which were originally detached from China in 1912.

The predominant characteristic of both Mongolia and Sinkiang is aridity. About ninety-five per cent of the total area is

¹ In full title the Mongol People's Republic; often, however, mentioned simply as Mongolia or as Outer Mongolia.



19. THE MONGOLS

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

either desert of sand or gravel, or grassland, good for pasture but incapable of cultivation. Arable land is found only in the south near the Great Wall, where the summer monsoons from the south bring some rain; in the valleys of the Altai and Sayan, which get their rainfall by westerly winds from the Atlantic; and at the foot of the T'ien-shan ranges, where streams fed by the snows of the high peaks can be used for irrigation in places where there is little or no rainfall. In Sinkiang there is more true desert than in Mongolia, but irrigated cultivation has been carried on in the oases from early times, so that the sedentary element of population has always been stronger relatively than in Mongolia, where most of the land is of the type intermediate between desert and arable and is well suited to an economy of nomadic herdsmen.

The main desert belt is formed by the Taklamakan, Kum Tagh and Gobi tracts stretching east-north-east from Yarkand to the Great Khingan. Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang lie on the farther side of this belt, and Inner Mongolia on the nearer side, as approached from China. A 'line of enormous sandhills'¹ marks the actual boundary between Inner and Outer Mongolia to the north of the Suiyüan-Hami motor caravan route, and the Gobi desert as a whole is a natural frontier of great impenetrability. It cuts off Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang from China while leaving them in close contact with the territories of the Soviet Union to the north and west. It is not surprising, therefore, that China should have found it difficult to hold under her authority the conquests of the Manchu empire on the other side of the 'sea of sand', and that Soviet influence should be paramount there, though with different effect at Urga and at Urumchi. Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, is well within China's reach, and would by now be firmly held by the Nanking government were it not for the Japanese penetration westward from South Manchuria and Hopei.

Apart from the Chinese there are three nationality elements in the Mongolia-Sinkiang region. The Mongols are scattered all

¹ Sir Eric Teichman, *Journey to Turkestan*, p. 49.

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

over Mongolia, except for Tannu-Tuva, and are also represented in the former 'Three Eastern Provinces' (Manchuria), in central Sinkiang (the Kalmuk enclave north of Karashar) and in Tsinghai to the south of the Kansu Chinese corridor; they speak various dialects of the Mongol language, and are all traditionally nomads by culture and Lama-Buddhists by religion. There are between four and five millions of them in all, and at least half of them numerically live in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but their numbers in these areas are inferior to the masses of Chinese in close proximity, so that Outer Mongolia, which is thoroughly Mongol, has for long been the national base.

To the north-west of Mongolia between the Sayan and Tannu-ola mountains dwell the Uriankhai, a very primitive people speaking a Turki language; they only number some 50,000, but have been put on the map through being endowed by the Russians with a state of their own (Tannu-Tuva) separate from the Mongol People's Republic.

On the other side of the Altai, in Sinkiang, are other Turki-speaking peoples, some sedentary and some nomad, Moslems by religion and thus traditionally akin to the Turki peoples of Soviet Central Asia—the Uzbeks, Turkomans, Khirgiz and Kazaks. The Turkis of Sinkiang appear to number about two million.

The Chinese inhabitants of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, numbering some five or six millions, are of two kinds: ordinary Chinese and Tungans. The latter are Chinese-speaking Moslems, and have long formed a distinct section of the Chinese people, sharply divided from their 'pagan' compatriots. Language binds the Tungans to China, but religion links them with the Turkis in a minority group. In the present generation there is a tendency for language to prevail over religion as the prime factor of affinity, and the Tungans show no sign at present of breaking away from China, though they continue to be a somewhat centrifugal element in the Chinese body politic.¹

¹ See page 52 on the symbolism of the five-barred Republican flag which counted the Moslems as a 'nation'.

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

The first result of the Chinese Revolution in the Mongolia-Sinkiang region was the successful revolt of Outer Mongolia. The rebels declared that they owed allegiance to the Ch'ing dynasty, but none to China, and the insurrection manifested a bitter enmity to the Chinese. The improvident Mongol nobles were everywhere in debt to Chinese moneylenders, and Chinese peasant settlers were continually encroaching on the pastures of the Mongol tribes to the north of the Great Wall. The independence movement was general in both Inner and Outer Mongolia; that it failed in the former region, while succeeding in the latter, was due not only to the advantages the rebels derived from the remoteness of Outer Mongolia and the barrier of the Gobi desert, but also to other factors. The old tribal organization of the Mongols had been preserved much better in Outer, than in Inner, Mongolia. The Mongols were divided into numerous 'banners' (*hoshun*) grouped into confederacies (*aimak*); of the latter there were only four in Outer, but twenty-four in Inner, Mongolia. The Inner Mongols were thus more split up than their kinsmen beyond the Gobi, and Peking governmental control over them was further increased by a system of artificial combinations called 'leagues' (*chiguglan*). As many of the banner princes also found profit in selling tribal lands to Chinese settlers, Chinese domination in Inner Mongolia was too strong to be broken down before the arrival of the Japanese.

The Mongol revolt in Outer Mongolia in 1912 was supported by Russia, who extorted from China recognition of Outer Mongolian autonomy under nominal Chinese sovereignty. The Russians at the same time made claims to the Uriankhai territory, now Tannu-Tuva, and secured its separation from Mongolia; after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 it was brought under direct Russian administration. Russian power, however, dwindled after the revolution of 1917, and the Chinese took the opportunity to send an expedition across the Gobi and capture Urga, the capital of autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Mongol princes called to their aid a White Russian force under Baron Ungern von Sternberg, who drove out the Chinese, but was

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himself overthrown by a Red Russian column pursuing him from Siberia. The new Soviet Russia renewed the independence of Outer Mongolia *vis-à-vis* China, but transformed its institutions with the aid of a revolutionary party among the Mongols. Power had been in the hands of the banner princes with the Buddhist metropolitan of Urga, the Khutukhtu or 'Living Buddha', as the head of the state; this régime was replaced in 1924 by the Mongol People's Republic with a popular national assembly as the legal sovereign. Tannu-Tuva had meanwhile been proclaimed a separate republic, the Russian colonists there being locally the most important element.

China has not had any control over the governments of Outer Mongolia or Tannu-Tuva for the last twenty years, and these states have external relations only with the Soviet Union, with which they have concluded military alliances. Chinese sovereignty over all this territory is still, however, juridically recognized by all other states, including the Soviet Union, and the new republics have not claimed sovereignty as 'Manchukuo' has done, though they are quite as effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the central government of China. The principal reason appears to have been that the Mongol and Uriankhai states and their Soviet Union protectors were content with the fact of separation and were willing to leave the empty form of sovereignty to China, whereas the restored Manchu monarchy in Hsinking could not acknowledge even nominally the supremacy of the Chinese Republic.


The Soviet Union did not have to keep an army of occupation in Outer Mongolia to prevent it from rejoining China of its own volition, for Mongol nationalism could be relied on to resist Chinese overtures. The social radicalism of the People's Republic has, however, alienated the formerly privileged noble and priestly classes and thus split the national independence movement into two factions, both anti-Chinese, but looking to different quarters for support. The 'Red' Mongols rely on the Soviet Union to sustain their cause, but the more conservative nationalists in Inner Mongolia, anxious to free themselves from the Chinese yoke, and yet unwilling to accept aid from the 'City of

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

the Red Heroes' (Ulan Bator Khoto—Urga, as renamed in 1924), turned to Japan when the columns of the Kwantung Army broke out from the Japanese railway zone of Manchuria across the Chinese-inhabited corn-lands to the Mongol steppe.

The Japanese were not slow to realize the value of an alliance with Mongol nationalism. No real separatism could be induced among the Chinese of Manchuria, but the anti-Chinese sentiment of the Mongols made them an ideal instrument for Japanese imperialism. The Mongol-inhabited western parts of Manchuria, including northern Jehol, were therefore detached and made into a new province called Hsingan (subsequently divided into four: North, East, West and South Hsingan), and the Mongols were given a special status and guarantees against Chinese officialdom in the new state structure of Manchukuo. The Japanese have not been entirely successful, however, in winning the support of the Manchukuo Mongols, for the economic urges of their imperialism have prevented them from leaving the Mongols alone to continue in their old ways of life. From the point of view of Japanese economy Hsingan is of great potential value as a producer of wool within the Japanese currency area; in time it might free the Japanese wool industry from dependence on imports from Australia. But the wool hitherto produced by the Mongol nomads is too coarse to be suitable for industrial purposes, and Japanese attempts to improve the breed of sheep have involved a degree of administrative interference and compulsion much resented by the Mongols.

The condition of the Mongols in 'Manchukuo' was nevertheless preferable to that of their kinsmen in Chahar and Suiyüan who remained under Chinese rule until 1937. The Chinese officials there continued to enclose Mongol tribal lands and sell or rent them to Chinese settlers from the south. In 1936 there was a Mongol revolt under the leadership of Prince Teh; the Kwantung Army supplied the rebels with munitions, but was restrained by the Tokyo government from serious intervention, and Teh was defeated. In the following year, however, after the Lukouchiao incident had precipitated general hostilities



H. Hsing-hsing-hsia stations
M. Mingshui

Sinking frontier stations
S. Shan-tan Miao

20. MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG: COMMUNICATIONS

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

against China, the Kwantung Army overran Chahar and Suiyuan as far as the terminus of the railway from Peiping at Paotou on the great northward bend of the Yellow River. An autonomous Mongol state covering the two provinces was then proclaimed under the name of Mêngchiang.

By capturing the railway up from Tientsin through Peking to Kalgan the Japanese obtained a new line of approach to Outer Mongolia if they were going to invade the latter country in the future. They already had a springboard for a march on Urga in the Barga district of northern Manchuria which projects to the west of Great Khingan mountains. With possession of Kalgan it became possible for them to attack Outer Mongolia from the east and south simultaneously. From Kalgan the old camel caravan route, by which the Russian tea trade with China had once been carried on, led north-westward across the Gobi desert, while from Suiyuan, further along the railway, another desert route ran westward to Hami in Sinkiang. But so far the Japanese conquerors have refrained from trying to follow either of these desolate trails into the deeper hinterland of Asia.

By her advance westward into Inner Mongolia Japan drove a wedge geographically between the Soviet Union and China. But the Soviet Union has continued to have contact with China by routes which remain out of reach of the Japanese. One is a trail across the desert from Urga to Ninghsia; another, much more important, is the dirt road from Chuguchak on the Soviet frontier by Urumchi (Tihwa) and Hami to Lanchow in Kansu. A considerable quantity of munitions has entered China by this route, though it is quite inadequate as a main channel of supply for the requirements of large-scale modern warfare.

Sinkiang is now held by a Chinese army which is implacably anti-Japanese because it consists mainly of exiles from Manchuria. A large number of troops of the army of Chang Hsüeh-liang who fought against the Japanese in 1931-2 finally fled across the frontier into Siberia; they were conveyed by the Trans-Siberian and Turksib railways and put back into Chinese territory over the Sinkiang border. Sinkiang was at the time in the

MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

throes of a Turki rebellion supported by an army of Tungans from Kansu, and it appeared likely that an independent Moslem state would be set up there, so that China would lose Sinkiang no less than Outer Mongolia. But the Turkis and Tungans took to fighting each other, the arrival of the Manchurians turned the scale in favour of Chinese authority, and a number of Soviet bombing aeroplanes sent to the aid of the provincial government settled the matter. The great Moslem revolt collapsed in 1934. It may be noted that Soviet policy in Sinkiang was the opposite to what it was in Outer Mongolia; in the latter region the Russians sustained Mongol separatism against China, while in the former they helped the Chinese to crush a separatist national insurrection. The reason was no doubt fear of the attraction which an independent Turki Moslem state in Sinkiang might have for the Turki Soviet citizens of Kazakhstan, Khirgizia and Uzbekistan. The capitulation of the Turkis and the retreat of the Tungans left Sinkiang under the rule of an energetic Chinese general who owed his position to support from Moscow, who stood for anti-Japanism in an extreme form, and who could not be a cause of unrest in Soviet Central Asia.

Chapter IX

SOUTH OF THE WALL

Of the eighteen provinces of China Proper—often known simply as the Eighteen Provinces (*shih pa shêng*)—five are of primary importance, holding key positions at the centre and at the four points of the compass respectively. These five contain, or contained five years ago, the seven most populous cities in China,¹ as shown in the following table:

	<i>Province</i>	<i>Cities</i>
<i>North</i> -	- Hopei	Peiping, Tientsin
<i>East</i> -	- Kiangsu	Shanghai, Nanking
<i>Centre</i> -	- Hupeh	Hankow
<i>West</i> -	- Szechwan	Chungking
<i>South</i> -	- Kwangtung	Canton


The five key provinces are linked together by China's two most important lines of internal communication, which intersect at Hankow: the west-to-east Yangtse river and the north-to-south Peiping-Canton railway. Of the seven cities Chungking, Hankow and Nanking are on the Yangtse, while Shanghai, though not actually on the river, acts as the seaport for its whole basin.

Three of the five provinces, Kwangtung, Kiangsu and Hopei, are coastal, and the whole tendency of economic development in the last hundred years has been to increase the importance of

¹ The figures as given by the *Chinese Year Book* of 1935-6 (not applicable to-day in view of mass exodus from places in the war zone) are as follows:

(1) Shanghai -	- 3,259,114	(5) Hankow -	- 777,993
(2) Peiping -	- 1,496,648	(6) Nanking -	- 681,855
(3) Tientsin -	- 1,387,462	(7) Chungking -	- 635,000
(4) Canton -	- 1,122,583		

The only other towns given as possessing more than 600,000 inhabitants are Changsha in Hunan, and Wenchow in Chekiang.



21. CHINA: RAILWAYS

SOUTH OF THE WALL

the maritime, relative to that of the interior, provinces of China. Even before the opening of China to extensive foreign trade, the real economic centre of gravity was located on the lower Yangtse in southern Kiangsu; in those days the most important intersection of routes was the crossing of the Tientsin-Hangchow Grand Canal (linking Hopei with Chekiang) and the Yangtse at Chinkiang. With the access of foreign shipping to the Yangtse delta, a vast amount of river, canal, coastwise and oceanic trade came to be concentrated there, and Shanghai, a medium-sized town in 1842, grew and grew until it became by far the largest city of China and the sixth largest in the world.

In 1928 Nanking was declared the capital of China by the government of the Kuomintang party, whose forces had captured the former capital, Peking, and were also in possession of Canton, Hankow and the Chinese-administered section of Shanghai. Nanking had the advantage of having been a capital at certain earlier periods in Chinese history, and it was further indicated by its proximity to Shanghai; this was specially important for revenue purposes, as the maritime customs have so far been the surest fiscal asset of any central government in China, and Shanghai provided nearly half their total takings—and an even greater proportion after the Manchurian customs had been subtracted in 1932.¹ Shanghai, the commercial and industrial metropolis, could not itself become the political capital, because half of it was under foreign administration (the International Settlement and French Concession).

As already pointed out in Chapter II, the Yellow River valley was the original seat of Chinese civilization, and the Yangtse valley long remained a country of forest and swamp with savage inhabitants. But the basin of the Yangtse not only contains a larger area of cultivable land than that of the Yellow River; the Yangtse itself, the fourth river of the world in length, is navigable for 2,000 miles from the sea, whereas the Yellow River is blocked by rapids in its upper, and by shoals and sandbanks in its lower course, so as to be of little use for navigation. As the

¹ In 1930, St. \$ 135 out of 281 millions; in 1934, St. \$ 175 out of 335 millions.

SOUTH OF THE WALL

Yangtse valley was brought under cultivation and long-distance trade increased, it was inevitable that the economic centre of gravity in China should tend to shift southward from the Yellow River; the centre of political power, however, remained usually in the north, mainly because the central government had to attend to the ever troublesome northern frontier and could not afford to be too far away from it, while the Mongol and Manchu conquerors of China naturally sought to exert their dominion from a point which was convenient for organizing the administration of China, but also within easy reach of their own northern homelands. Such a point was Peiping, the Cambaluc of Kublai Khan, in the extreme north of China Proper, but about half-way between Canton and the Amur. Except for a period from 1368 to 1421 when Nanking was the capital, the Yüan (Mongol), Ming and Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasties ruled from Peiping—latterly called Peking or 'Northern Capital' (1280-1911).

After the Republic had replaced the Manchu dynasty Peking remained the capital, but it was now neither the seat of an impressive imperial court nor the centre of the new progressive nationalism which had created the Republic. The latter had its headquarters at Canton. Kwangtung, separated from northern and central China by the Nanling mountain range, has always had a strong provincial individuality, and throughout the period of the Manchu dynasty had been the focus of antagonism to the conquering race; in addition to this it had had long contact with foreign countries through trade and the emigration of Cantonese to the Dutch Indies, Malaya and California. Thus Canton became the principal base of the Chinese Revolution, while Peking remained in spirit a stronghold of the *ancien régime* even after the collapse of the monarchy.


The spearhead of the revolution was the Kuomintang party with a nucleus of Cantonese politicians who, finding it impossible to consolidate the initial success of the revolution in China as a whole, repudiated Peking and all its works and set up a separate government at Canton in 1917. For nine years the Kuomintang ruled in Kwangtung, while various factions of 'war

NOTE ON MAP 22

All population statistics for China must be accepted with some reserve, as no satisfactory census of the country as a whole has ever been carried out, and estimates vary from a maximum of nearly 500 millions total down to only 250 millions (Legendre). It is probably safe to allow just under 400 millions for China Proper and the outer lands, exclusive of Manchuria, at the time of the outbreak of the present war. The figures used for the map opposite are taken from the *Chinese Year Book* of 1937, and the totals by provinces in millions (to the nearest million) are as follows:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Pop. in millions</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Pop. in millions</i>
1. Szechwan ¹	47	13. Yunnan	12
2. Shantung	35	14. Shansi	11
3. Honan	33	15. Shensi	10
4. Kiangsu	31	16. Fukien	10
5. Kwangtung	31	17. Kweichow	7
6. Hunan	28	18. Kansu	6
7. Hopei	27	19. Sinkiang	2
8. Hupeh	27	20. Suiyuan	2
9. Anhwei	22	21. Chahar	2
10. Chekiang	20	22. Tsinghai	1
11. Kiangsi	16	23. Sikang	1
12. Kwangsi	13	24. Ninghsia	1

¹ The 1936 edition of the *Chinese Year Book*, however, gives the population of Szechwan as only 37 millions. It has on the other hand been estimated at more than 50 millions.




22. CHINA: DENSITY OF POPULATION BY PROVINCES

SOUTH OF THE WALL

lords' warred on each other in the rest of China; then in 1926 the party's army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, marched north and won, first Hankow, then Nanking and Shanghai, and finally Peking,¹ for the new dispensation. China was thus re-unified (though the new unity was far from complete) by a movement sweeping the country from south to north. It is to be noted that the Japanese invasion has proceeded in the reverse direction, spreading from north to south in the track of the old-time Khitan, Mongol and Manchu hordes. Japan, however, unlike the former nomad powers of the northern steppes, has been able to attack China also by sea along the whole of her coastline from Shanhaikwan, where the Great Wall reaches the shore of the Liaotung Gulf, to the border of Indo-China. This capacity for overseas invasion was used by Japan more and more as the war went on and China showed no sign of giving up the struggle, but at the outset it seems that the Japanese military leaders intended to confine their operations to the 'Five Northern Provinces'—that is to say, Hopei, Shansi and Shantung south of the Great Wall and Chahar and Suiyuan to the north of it—which they hoped to detach from China and make into a 'second Manchukuo' under Japanese control. The project miscarried, not merely because the fighting in the north caused, as previously in 1932, an outbreak in Shanghai involving a military expedition to Central China, but also because it was not possible to fight a war of limited objectives south of the Great Wall, if China had a resolute will to resist. Manchuria, though a large country, is divided by a very definite natural frontier from China Proper. But there are no clear-cut natural frontiers between North and Central China and the attempt to break off pieces of territory south of the Wall was found to involve going further and further into the interior; the Chinese, for their part, though unable to hold back the Japanese forces in pitched battle in the plains, had

¹ Peking was not, however, captured by the forces under Chiang Kai-shek, whose advance from Nanking was interrupted by the clash with the Japanese at Tsinan, but by the army of Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, who threw in his lot with the Kuomintang after their victories on the Yangtse.



DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQ. MILE AND NAME OF REGION

- | | |
|--|--|
| | 897 Yangtse Plain |
| | 647 North China Plain |
| | 581 Red Basin of Szechwan |
| | 421 South Yangtse Hills (a) |
| | 417 South-eastern Coast (b) |
| | 290 Central mountain belt (A) |
| | 285 Hills of Liangkwan (B) |
| | 286 Mountains of Shantung, Jehol, Lao-tung (C) |
| | 211 Loess Highlands |
| | 157 South-western tableland |

CULTIVATED LAND

Percentage of cultivated land (black square) to total area of the region (white square).

3495 Density of population per sq. mile on cultivated land only.

1.1 Area of cultivated land per person (in mow; 100 mow = 16.47 acre).

Figures used to make this map are from G. F. Cressey (*Geographical Foundations of China*). Areas of regions correspond to planimeter reading and are adopted from the same work.

23. CHINA: AGRICULTURE

SOUTH OF THE WALL


an almost inaccessible base in the great mountain-girt western province of Szechwan, and China's very poverty of communications and still primitive dispersal of economic life turned out to be her greatest assets in a war of 'protracted resistance'.

The Five Northern Provinces are economically important, not so much for their actual productiveness as for their potential wealth as the region of future location for the biggest heavy industry in the Far East. To quote from a paper read to the World Engineering Congress in 1929:¹ 'Disregarding political boundaries, perhaps the best potential combination in the Pacific region [for heavy industry] would be between the iron ores of India or of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies on the one hand, and the coking coal of the north-eastern provinces of China on the other, with smelting centred on the Chinese coast, possibly on the Bay of Pe-chi-li [Po Hai].' In other words, as North China has the best supply of coking coal in the Far East, and as, owing to the relative tonnages involved, iron ore moves to coal rather than the reverse, the seaboard of Hopei is indicated as the best site in the Far East for the growth of a heavy industry. Nor would such an industry be entirely dependent on imports of iron ore from the overseas sources mentioned in the above quotation; the Five Northern Provinces contain not only the principal coking coal deposits of the Far East, but also the 'most important single iron ore region in China'²—the Hsuanlung deposits in Chahar, estimated at 90 million tons of high grade, or more than the entire estimated reserves of Japan and Korea put together. The Hsuanlung field lies about 150 miles north-west of Peiping, and its natural outlet is to Hopei, where the Kaiping coalfield supplies coking coal.

To the west of Hopei lies Shansi with more than half of China's estimated probable coal reserve, which is about thirty times Japan's. Because of Shansi's inland seclusion its coal resources can only be made available with the aid of railways, and the

¹ C. K. Leith, 'The World's Iron Ore Supply'. Quoted by H. Foster Bain, *Ores and Industry in the Far East*, p. 265.

² Bain, *Ores and Industry in the Far East*, p. 96.



Source : General statement on the Mining Industry in China (National Geological Survey) presented by the Information Bulletin, Council of International Affairs, Nanking.

The circles for Shansi and Shensi are to be enlarged five and three times respectively.

24. CHINA: ESTIMATED COAL RESOURCES

SOUTH OF THE WALL


Japanese in 1936 formulated a plan for a line from Shihchia-chwang to Tsangchow to link the Shansi coal mines with the coast. China's refusal to grant Japan concessions either for the construction of this railway or for the exploitation of the Chahar iron ores was one of the principal reasons for the tension which led to the outbreak of war at the end of July 1937. The Kwantung Army and its powerful financial partner, the Manchukuo Heavy Industry Company, were determined to obtain control of the mineral resources of Hopei, Chahar and Shansi, and the government of Chiang Kai-shek was no less determined to prevent them.

Besides coal and iron another raw material sought by Japan was cotton. Cotton cannot be produced successfully in Japan, Korea or Manchuria, but China Proper is one of the five principal producing countries of the world (the other four being the U.S.A., India, the Soviet Union and Egypt). The great Japanese cotton textile industry was built up entirely on imported raw material, and in the days of relatively free trade and budgets not too unbalanced this was quite a practical procedure. But after 1931 Japan plunged deep into the mazes of inflationary finance, and while her export trade boomed, her exchange difficulties became ever more and more embarrassing. The urge to enclose a cotton-growing area within the currency domain of the yen had become very strong in the Japanese textile industry by 1937. It is an essential part of Japanese expansion to provide conquered regions with a currency tied to the yen, so as to reduce the amount of imports which must be paid for in currencies not under Japanese control. Cotton is produced in western Shantung, Hopei and southern Shansi, so that enclosure of the Five Northern Provinces could be of great benefit¹ to the Japanese textile industry as well as to heavy industrial interests.

Apart from raw materials, Japan's principal economic aim in China has been to reverse the trend of Chinese tariff policy. In the words of the *Japan Year Book* for 1937:² 'The Manchurian

¹ So far this aim has not been realized, as Chinese guerrillas have prevented the marketing of the crop.

² P. 424.



25. CHINA: COAL AND IRON PRODUCTION 1936


SOUTH OF THE WALL

Incident, 1931, enabled Japan to get the lion's share in the foreign trade of Manchukuo . . . but on the other hand, combined with the Shanghai Affair, it intensified the anti-Japanese movement in China. Increases in China's tariffs on Japanese goods were also effected in rapid succession, thus dealing a great blow to Japan's trade with China¹ and at the same time furnishing a chance for the United States, Great Britain and Germany to recover their commercial influence of former years in that country.' Japan's exports to China declined in value between 1930 and 1936 (even allowing for subtraction of the Manchurian share from the 1930 figures), while the export total to Asia as a whole almost doubled. The war since 1937 has given Japan control of ports which normally handle about nine-tenths of China's foreign trade, and through the puppet governments set up at Peiping and Nanking the Japanese have had the tariff rates revised in their favour, though the fighting and devastation have so interrupted trade that there is little enough for anyone at the present time.

If the Five Northern Provinces are of greater importance for heavy industry raw materials, Shanghai is the key point commercially and has been the special objective of the Japanese exporting light industries. A similar distinction of group aims may be discerned as regards the negative purpose of Japanese policy: the prevention of China's competitive industrialization and evolution to Great Power rank. By seizing the only region of China suitable for the development of a large-scale iron and steel industry, the Japanese have thwarted China's advance to economic supremacy in the Far East for as long as they can hold the positions they have gained; by the capture of the Shanghai-Nanking area they have taken into their own hands the rapidly growing Chinese cotton industry, which was already a formidable rival to the mills of Osaka and Kobe.

The economic ends of Japanese policy would have been well enough served by control of the Five Northern Provinces plus

¹ The tariffs did not discriminate against Japan by name, but were raised against all types and qualities of goods in which Japan specialized.




26. CHINA: MINERAL PRODUCTION 1936

SOUTH OF THE WALL

Kiangsu without any further advance. But as the Kuomintang had declared its resolve to continue the war indefinitely, and as the Chinese main army escaped destruction in the Shanghai and Lunghai Railway battles, strategy required the capture also of the third and fifth of the previously mentioned five key centres of China—Hankow and Canton. Both these places were taken in the autumn of 1938. But still China refused to submit; the Chinese government withdrew to Chungking behind the great mountain barrier which divides Szechwan from Hupeh, and the Japanese were left with the most important cities of China in their hands but local resistance everywhere in the countryside and no means of bringing the war decisively to an end. They were also embarrassed by increasing diplomatic opposition to their policy from the U.S.A., culminating in the notice of abrogation of the Japanese-American trade treaty of 1911, which was served on Japan in July 1939. This attitude of the U.S.A. and the supplies sent to China from the U.S.S.R. gave the Chinese at Chungking the indispensable moral support and encouragement which they needed in order to go on fighting. China was suffering terribly from the strain of war and there was little hope in the near future of any successful counter-offensive for the recovery of the lost territory, but Chinese statesmen, viewing the world situation, could reckon that a world war was not far off and that by refusing to concede any of her legal rights by a separate peace China would have her reward in the final settlement of accounts. Chungking political circles never wavered from their belief in the ultimate inevitability of a Japanese-American war; the correct policy was, therefore, to wait for it as patiently as possible and meanwhile to avoid any negotiations with Japan except on the basis of unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese armies from Chinese territory.

The Japanese on their side were not unaware of these Chinese hopes. It was open to them to mobilize greater military forces than they had yet used and try to obtain a final military decision by breaking through to Chungking in spite of the great difficulties of terrain and communications. They preferred, however,



Intensive sericulture



Main cultivation of tea



Principal cotton-producing provinces



Rape seeds



Ground nuts



Tung seed



Soya bean



Sesame seed


Provinces are shown which have an annual production of vegetable oil of 500,000 piculs minimum

27. CHINA: TEA, SILK, COTTON AND VEGETABLE OIL PRODUCTION

SOUTH OF THE WALL

themselves to play a waiting game, and they undertook no really big offensive campaign after the end of 1938. They appear to have had two main reasons for this policy. In the first place they kept on hoping for a political and economic disintegration of China which would compel Chungking sooner or later to negotiate. They relied on an intensified blockade of, or at, the ports and interception of trade routes in the interior to keep Free China short of all kinds of commodities and induce discontent and despair; politically they set their hopes on the feuds and jealousies of cliques within the Kuomintang and on the more fundamental hostility between the Kuomintang and the Communists, who found it hard to co-operate in the 'National United Front' after years of civil war. Japan had a measure of success in manœuvres designed to make use of Chinese dissensions; Wang Ching-wei, the old rival of Chiang Kai-shek in the Kuomintang, was induced to leave Chungking and afterwards to head a rival Government set up under Japanese protection at Nanking, while the Kuomintang-Communist enmity flared up from time to time in actual fighting and Japanese propaganda had some effect on the more conservative Chinese generals in suggesting to them that the Communists were reaping the political fruits of the popular resistance to Japan.

The second Japanese motive for inactivity in China was one which corresponded to the Chinese hope of Japan being involved in a major war. The Japanese leaders saw that even if, by paying a high price in men and material, they could achieve a knock-out military blow against China, Japan would be left so much the weaker for resisting diplomatic pressure from the U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R., and might be deprived of her gains by such pressure, as she had previously been thwarted in peace negotiations after victorious wars in 1895 and 1905. From the beginning of 1939, therefore, Japan's military preparations were devoted to the eventuality of a major war rather than to fresh offensives in China. Actually, the hardest fighting Japan had to do in 1939 was not against China at all, but against the highly mechanized forces of the U.S.S.R. in the battle of Nomonhan



28. CHINA: THE JAPANESE INVASION 1937-42

SOUTH OF THE WALL

on the border of Mongolia. Japan's apparent failure to obtain any important military result in China after the end of 1938 was, however, widely interpreted in Western countries as proof of her military incompetence—a misunderstanding which led Britain and the U.S.A. seriously to underestimate Japan's strength in 1941.

China's main preoccupation after 1938, in order to survive as an organized state and keep the war going, was to develop new routes for trade with the outer world so as to compensate for the loss of Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton and other former centres of foreign commerce. From October 1938 up to July 1940 the railway from Haiphong in French Indo-China up to Kunming in Yunnan was the main artery, though it was never sufficient to handle all the goods sent by it and vast stocks accumulated in warehouses at Haiphong. Trade was also carried on with Hongkong and Manila through the Japanese naval blockade by numerous small craft from minor ports of the South China coast not under Japanese occupation. From the west of China there were two overland routes—the 'Red Road' to the U.S.S.R. by Lanchow and Urumchi and the 'Burma Road' from Kunming to the railhead at Lashio in Burma communicating with Rangoon. The route to the U.S.S.R., running for most of the way over gravel desert and steppe passable for lorries, did not require much constructional work; the Burma Road, on the other hand, had to be taken with many hairpin bends over high mountains liable to torrential rainfall in the wet season and its construction was a remarkable feat of engineering. The Burma Road was first opened to traffic in December 1938, but for a long time carried only about a tenth of the freight passing along the Haiphong-Kunming railway, though even this was more than came into China by the Sinkiang route.

In July 1940 France yielded to Japanese pressure and closed the Kunming railway. Britain also closed the Burma Road for three months, but reopened it in October. During 1941 efforts were made to increase the traffic capacity of the Burma Road with the aid of American transport experts and American

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fighter pilots were sent out to provide aircraft protection for the road against Japanese bombing raids. But after Japan went to war with Britain Japanese forces entered Burma through Siam and after some weeks of fighting took Rangoon, subsequently advancing also northward to Mandalay and Bhamo. The flow of supplies to China through Burma was thus stopped and meanwhile the coastal blockade of China had been completed by the capture of Hongkong and Manila, which had been the main distributing centres for the blockade-runners. China is thus today more isolated than ever before, though it is hoped to remedy the situation to some extent by developing air transport from India. The Japanese encirclement of China now extends in an immense arc from Paotou on the Yellow River to Rangoon on the Bay of Bengal. But, although this encirclement may reduce still further China's already slender counter-offensive capacity, it is unlikely that it can by itself break down China's resistance. The Chinese know that their destiny is now being decided by warfare elsewhere than in China and, in spite of Japan's early successes in the Pacific war, they remain full of hope in the ultimate outcome.

Chapter X

THE SOUTH SEA LANDS

To the south of Japan and China and to the north of Australia, between the line of the Northern Tropic and latitude 10° south of the Equator, lies the region which the Japanese call Nanyo or the 'South Sea' and which they have now sought to include by conquest within their 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'. This region consists geographically of two parts: the south-eastern extremity of the Asiatic continent which comprises Indo-China, Siam and Malaya, and the multitude of large and small islands scattered over the vast expanse of ocean from Luzon in the north to Timor in the south and from Sumatra in the west to New Guinea in the east.

How far the islands of the 'South Sea' should be considered a part of Asia or of the Far East is a difficult question, as there is no clear division between these islands and the various archipelagos of the western and central Pacific which are generally grouped under the name of 'Oceania'. There is, indeed, a natural boundary known as Wallace's Line, which separates a submarine plateau joined to continental Asia from deeper water to the east; the islands west of this line have flora and fauna closely related to those of south-eastern Asia, while the islands to the east show forms of life similar to those of Australia and Oceania. Wallace's Line, however, actually runs between Borneo and Celebes and between Bali and Lombok in the Lesser Sunda Islands, and such a division is hardly convenient from the ethnic or political point of view. The Malayan Islamic culture which first spread from Sumatra has extended its domain eastward to Halmahera, and the political unity created by the Dutch—the 'Netherlands East Indies'—reaches from the west coast of Sumatra to the middle of New Guinea. Moreover, New

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Guinea is the most easterly of the group of *big* islands, which by their size stand in marked contrast to the host of small islands in the much larger space between New Guinea and the coast of South America. New Guinea is also for Japan the South Sea land *par excellence*; the longitude of Tokyo passes through it. On all these grounds it seems reasonable to regard New Guinea as the south-eastern limit of the 'Far East'.


At the time of writing nearly all the territory of the South Sea Region is under Japanese occupation as a result of the 'Greater East Asia War' which Japan launched on 7th December 1941. On that date the region was divided between eight sovereignties, of which two were Asiatic, four European, one Oceanic and one American. The Asiatic states were the kingdom of Siam, the only indigenous nation of the region to enjoy full independence, and Japan as holder of the Mariana and Caroline Island groups to the north of New Guinea, formally under a Mandate of the League of Nations. The four European Powers were Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal, all of whom held territories acquired during the long period of European overseas colonial expansion beginning with the Portuguese voyages of the early sixteenth century. The Oceanic Power was the Commonwealth of Australia holding eastern New Guinea and adjacent islands, partly under unrestricted rule (Papua) and partly under League of Nations Mandate. Finally the United States of America still held formal sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago taken from Spain in 1898, though pledged to concede complete independence to a Philippine Republic in the year 1946.

Of all these political divisions only Siam corresponded closely to a real native nationality. The Siamese or Thai, as they call themselves—the name 'Siam' is the same as 'Shan'—have a single common language, a single common traditional religion (Hinayana Buddhism, which also prevails in Ceylon and Burma) and a national kingdom which goes back, with varying frontiers, to the thirteenth century. The only considerable ethnic minority is that formed by Chinese immigrants. In the nineteenth cen-

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ture, however, Siam owed its survival as an independent state, not so much to any inherent strength as to the desire of Britain and France to maintain a buffer between their respective empires in the Far East. To the east the kingdoms of Annam and Cambodia were absorbed by France and to the west Burma was annexed by Britain, but Siam kept her sovereignty, though she lost outlying territory both to Britain and to France.

In the twentieth century a modernizing nationalist movement grew up in Siam and produced a revolution in 1932. Internally the nationalists aimed at administrative reorganization and economic development of the country; externally the more extreme of them began to play with irredentist ambitions. The modern conception of nationality based on language led them to claim the union with Siam of all Thai-speaking peoples including the Laos of French Indo-China and the Shans of Burma and southern Yunnan, while at the same time they claimed on historic grounds Cambodia and the sultanates of northern Malaya over which Siam had formerly held suzerainty, though neither of these areas was Thai-speaking. None of these claims could be attained except at the expense of Britain, France or China, and in so far as they were taken seriously in Siamese ruling circles they inevitably drew Siamese policy towards alliance with Japan, even though it was obvious that Japan's 'new order' meant Japanese supremacy over all countries within its scope. The relation of Siam to Japan thus came to be very similar to that of Hungary to Germany in Europe—a mixture of mistrust and hope of territorial favours which prevented any clear-cut decision of policy until the decision was forced to the advantage of the conquering aggressor. After the collapse of France in the summer of 1940 Siam opened hostilities on the Indo-China border with the purpose of recovering the 'lost territory' in that quarter and succeeded with Japanese mediation in getting back some of it. After the Japanese occupation of Indo-China in August 1941 Japanese military units were stationed close to the frontier and, when in December Japan demanded passage through Siamese territory for operations against Malaya



□ First-class naval bases

----- Former Pan-American Airways line Hawaii-Manila

..... Boundaries of Pacific Mandated Areas

+ + + + + Japanese air line Tokyo-Timor opened in 1941

29. THE WESTERN PACIFIC

THE SOUTH SEA LANDS

and Burma, Siam capitulated after a few hours' resistance and then went over to the side of the invader.

In contrast to Siam, Indo-China is an artificial creation which does not correspond to an ethnic unit. There are three peoples: the Annamese, the Cambodians (Khmers) and the Laos (Thais). The Annamese, who are by far the most numerous of the three, have gradually in the course of centuries spread southward down the littoral of the South China Sea from Tongking, the valley and delta of the Red River, where they have always been in close contact with China and have adopted the essentials of Chinese civilization. At the southern extremity of Indo-China, in the Mekong delta area, known as Cochin-China, the Annamese overcame and absorbed a people called the Chams, of whom only an insignificant number now survive as a distinct group. Annam thus came to consist of a very elongated territory with two rich deltaic areas, Tongking and Cochin-China, linked by the coastal strip of Annam Proper which is divided from the Mekong basin inland by a range of high mountains. The suzerain king or 'emperor' of Annam had, and still has, his capital at Hue, mid-way between Tongking and Cochin-China.

To the west of Annam lies a region where supremacy was formerly disputed between Annam and Siam. This includes the kingdom of Cambodia and a number of small Thai principalities now included in the Indo-China protectorate of Laos. Cambodia is a country with a great past; like Cochin-China it belongs to the Mekong basin, but its centre, instead of being the delta, is the lake of Tonle Sap, which receives a seasonal overflow of flood water from the great river. Here emigrants from southern India in the early centuries A.D. founded a powerful kingdom which had Sanskrit for its official language and Sivaism for its state religion; the foundation of this realm was the Khmer people whose language is akin to the Mon speech of south-eastern Burma and the Khasia of Assam. The famous ruins of Angkor close to the shore of Tonle Sap attest the wealth and high culture of Cambodia in the days of its power. But from the thirteenth

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century onwards the Siamese encroached on Cambodia and ravaged it in a series of wars. The weakened kingdom fell into dependence on its more powerful neighbours, Siam and Annam, who competed for ascendancy over it, while the Khmer people accepted the Siamese form of Buddhism as their religion and Sivaism disappeared. Siamese influence was predominant in Cambodia both politically and culturally when the French declared a protectorate over it in 1863. Further up the Mekong, the Lao tribes to the east of the river speak Thai dialects akin to Siamese; a hundred years ago they were more or less independent in their hill-girt valleys, but France incorporated them along with Annam and Cambodia in her colonial domain to which she gave the name of 'l'Union de l'Indo-Chine'.

The French gave to Indo-China a common administrative framework and French speech as a common official language, but the Annamese people was divided rather than unified by the effects of French rule. Cochin-China was made a full 'Colony' like Algeria, sending a representative to the French Chamber of Deputies in Paris; full rights as French citizens could be obtained by Annamese who reached a certain educational standard and were willing to accept the French legal code—which involved the renunciation of Annamese customary law. Tongking was not a colony in this sense, but a protectorate; however, the French administration was virtually as direct as in Cochin-China. Annam Proper was a real protectorate in that there continued to be a reigning Annamese monarch in whose name government was carried on. Annamese politics reflected these divergencies; there was an agitation among the 'assimilés' for reforms within the framework of French rule, a revolutionary nationalist movement drawing inspiration from the example of the Chinese Kuomintang, and a residue of conservative national sentiment attached to the monarch at Hue. On this complicated political pattern Japanese occupation has recently been superimposed.


The Far Eastern domains of other Western nations show a general similarity to French Indo-China in that they do not

NOTE ON MAP 30

The Netherlands East Indies, together with British protected Sarawak and Brunei, have recently had a total annual production of oil of about 9 million tons. Of this total over half came from the fields of southern Sumatra. Other fields are in northern Sumatra, in Java, in the north and east of Borneo and in the island of Ceram in the Moluccas. The refineries were everywhere destroyed as part of the British and Dutch 'scorched earth' policy, but the Japanese have announced their intention of rebuilding them on the spot instead of taking the crude oil to Japan for refining.

The zone of important tin deposits extends from Burma southward to islands off the east coast of Sumatra between Singapore and Java. Before the outbreak of the European war British Malaya held first place and the Netherlands East Indies fourth in the world's output of tin.

Iron ore has hitherto been mined on a considerable scale only in Malaya and the Philippines; from the former Japan formerly imported roughly 2 million, and from the latter, 1 million, tons a year. Apart from the ores so far worked commercially, however, there are huge deposits of lateritic iron ore in the north-east of Mindanao, in central Celebes and in south-eastern Borneo; owing to the difficulty of working these ores they have not been worth mining for ordinary commercial competition in the world market; but they are of great potential importance for the future of heavy industry in the Far East. It remains to be seen how far Japan will be able to expand iron ore production in the South Sea Region during the course of the present war, to meet the needs of her armament industries.



30. OIL, IRON AND TIN OF THE EAST INDIES

THE SOUTH SEA LANDS

correspond in each case to any single ethnic unit or pre-existing unified state, but have been formed by piecemeal conquests out of a diversity of peoples, tribes and kingdoms. A consequence of this is that large new distinct aggregates of Asiatic population have been formed with a tendency to develop national consciousness, but dependent for intercommunication on the languages of the alien rulers, which are in any case only spoken and read by a comparatively small educated class. Thus in the Philippines there are about a score of native languages, of which Tagalog, Ilocano and Visayan are the most important; before 1898, Spanish, and since 1898, English, have served as common languages for the upper class throughout the islands. But the leaders of the Filipino nationalist movement, with the prospect of independent statehood ahead of them, could not be satisfied with the use of a foreign language which was nowhere the speech of the people; in 1936, therefore, the Commonwealth legislature decreed that Tagalog, the language of Manila and central Luzon, should be henceforth the official language of the Philippines. As, however, the majority of the inhabitants of the Philippines do not understand Tagalog, it is only by means of elementary school education over a period of a generation that the Filipino nation can provide itself with a common language for the whole population.

The very name 'Filipino' bears witness to the Spanish origin of modern Filipino nationality and the strongest factor of cohesion in the making of it has been the Catholic Christian religion which the Spanish conquerors introduced. Except in certain mountain tracts, where the population retained its ancient paganism, and in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago where Islam already prevailed, the inhabitants of the Philippines in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries accepted the religion of their rulers and to this extent shared a common cultural life with them. Catholicism linked the Filipino with Europe and America rather than with Asia and, though this was far from the intention of the Church, prepared the way for those influences of democratic liberalism which inspired

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the Filipino national leaders of the later nineteenth century. Without the Spanish Christian connection there would be no separate Filipino nation, for geographically there is no reason for drawing a line between the southern Philippines and Borneo, and at the time of the Spanish conquest sea-rovers from the south-west were spreading from one island to another the Islamic faith and way of living which had previously been received in Brunei. If Spanish arms had not reversed this process, it is likely that Luzon and the Visayas would have become as much Moslem as Borneo or Sumatra.


In the Netherlands East Indies a consciousness of nationality called 'Indonesian' has recently come into being. As in the Philippines, there is no common language corresponding to the national designation. Malay is used almost everywhere on the coasts as a language of trade, but many other languages are spoken. Two-thirds of the total population of the Netherlands East Indies live in Java and Madura and speak three languages—Sundanese, Javanese and Madurese; Javanese, which has an important literary heritage, is a more highly developed language than Malay, but is not understood outside Java. The only effective language of intercommunication for Indonesians has so far in fact been Dutch. In contrast to the Philippines the traditional religious bond is not Christianity, but Islam; Java is entirely Moslem and so are at least the coastal tracts of most of the other islands, though there are large non-Moslem minorities—Christian, Hindu (in Bali) and 'pagan.'

Malaya has a far more homogeneous *native* population than either the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies, for its inhabitants, excluding recent immigrants, are almost all Malay by language and Moslem by religion. The recent immigrants, however, have entirely changed the ethnic picture; Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indians, have entered the country in such numbers that they now outnumber the Malays. It has been the British policy to reserve administrative posts for British or Malay personnel and treat the Chinese and Indian communities as alien elements in Malaya, thus compensating the Malays for

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allowing them to become a minority in their own country. The mixture of peoples in Malaya has, however, created a peculiarly difficult problem of nationalities for any future time when Malaya may have to make its way without either British or Japanese control.

Prior to the Spanish, Dutch and British conquests there were in the South Sea Region a multitude of monarchical authorities bearing titles of sultan, raja or datu and ranging in size from realms of several thousand square miles to chiefries of one or more villages. In the greater part of the Philippines these native principalities were superseded by direct Spanish administration, which was supplemented by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and its religious orders; only in the Moro (Moslem) country of Mindanao and Sulu, which was never really subdued by the Spaniards, did native monarchical rule survive. The Americans, who had had no previous experience of indirect rule through kings and had a natural antipathy to such a procedure, completed the work of the Spaniards by depriving the Moro sultans and datus of their powers in the decade after 1898. This levelling process cleared the way in the Philippines for the building of the unitary, elective, republican régime which was established in 1936 under an American supervision due in accordance with the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act to come to an end in 1946. The British and Dutch, on the other hand, made great use of indirect rule through native principalities. In Malaya all the territory outside the Straits Settlements (consisting of Singapore Island, Penang Island, Province Wellesley and Malacca) was left to nine Malay states under the general direction of British 'residents' or 'advisers'. In the Dutch East Indies about half the total area, though only one-fifth of the total population, was left to native states; this form of rule was much more important in the Outer Islands than in Java, of which more than 90 per cent by area was under direct administration. In practice the two kinds of administration were not so very different, owing to the constant interference by the British and Dutch authorities in the affairs of the native states.



31. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

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Socially and psychologically, however, the system of indirect rule has had important consequences, for it has tended to preserve an aristocratic social order and strengthen conservative opposition to democratic nationalist movements led by middle-class intelligentsia. In general, there was up to 1941 no strong native leadership in French Indo-China, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies capable of seriously disturbing the European rulers of those territories, but neither were there any representative national figures who could or would give such political support in the hour of crisis as President Quezon gave to the American forces in the Philippines.

No amount of popular support, however, would have enabled Britain, France and the Netherlands to hold their Far Eastern colonial empires against Japanese invasion without a sufficiency of military, naval and air forces. Even in the Philippines the factor of national resistance to Japanese aggression could only be effective within narrow limits. The fate of the South Sea Region depended in 1941 on the larger strategic situation produced by the European war, the collapse of France and the commitments of the U.S.A. in two oceans. This situation was such as to put Singapore and the Borneo and Sumatra oil-fields in great danger of sudden seizure, especially after Vichy France had separated herself from the cause of Britain and the Netherlands and had admitted Japanese military forces into Indo-China. Unfortunately the reality of the situation was obscured by very widespread and persistent illusions as to Japan's capacity for waging war. Thus Major G. Fielding Eliot wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 21st August, 1941: 'The equipment, training and organization of the Japanese Army do not lead most observers to think it capable of meeting a first-class Western army. . . . Further advance from Indo-China probably means a clash with British, Australian and Indian troops of high quality, superior in equipment to the Japanese. The Japanese air forces, military and naval, have never been highly esteemed by Western observers. . . . It is hardly possible to imagine that Japan's rulers can hope for a moment to sustain the shock of

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war on three widely separated fronts—Thailand, China and Manchuria—against vastly superior forces, against air superiority, with her lines of communication hazardous and with the problem of external blockade to deal with as well . . . while Russia fights vigorously and must in her own interest help those from whom she expects help.’


This was an expression of personal opinion, but the prevalence of such views in high quarters was implied in the failure of the authorities concerned, both British and American, to achieve a degree of military and naval preparedness appropriate to a policy of challenging Japan to war by cutting off her oil supplies. In the event Russia remained neutral while Japan struck southwards, and the despised Japanese air force was the fatal spearhead of the offensive. The Japanese owed their rapid success partly to careful planning and skilful tactical use of their forces, but fundamentally to the superior strategic position from which they launched their attack. They had two systems of bases in the South Seas, the one consisting of Hainan and Indo-China (with the surreptitiously annexed Spratly Islands, renamed Shinnangunto by the Japanese, as an outpost off the northern coast of Borneo), and the other formed by the Mandated Islands in the Pacific—the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups, strung out in the ocean between Hawaii and the Philippines. While Indo-China served as a springboard for an attack on Malaya, the Mandated Islands provided a screen against intervention in the China Seas by the American Pacific Fleet based on Pearl Harbour. The whole campaign depended on the capture of Singapore and this in turn depended on success in holding off the American Pacific Fleet. The sudden initial attack by torpedo bombers on Pearl Harbour (following the precedent of the surprise torpedo attack on Port Arthur with which Japan began the war against Russia in 1904) was the perfect solution to the problem which confronted the Japanese Navy Staff in the autumn of 1941. But even if this attack had miscarried and the American fleet had remained intact, the Japanese Navy would still have had a great strategic advantage for deal-

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ing with any American move from Hawaii in the direction of the Philippines or Singapore. The Japanese would have been in a position to force the Americans to give battle at some point near the Marianas or Carolines, where the Japanese fleet would have had the advantage of support from local air and submarine bases. The Americans had indeed one base in the very middle of the Japanese island system, namely the island of Guam, which with suitable fortifications and facilities could have provided the battle fleet based on Pearl Harbour with the support it needed for an offensive in the Western Pacific. But Guam, long left unfortified owing to the influence of the Isolationists in Congress and at last being hastily prepared for its task, was still in December 1941 virtually defenceless.

With the strength of the Pearl Harbour fleet for the time being fatally reduced and Guam and Wake Island occupied by Japanese landing forces, Japan rapidly pushed forward overseas invasions of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and an overland invasion of Burma. Singapore, the sole non-Japanese battleship base in the Far East and the pivot of the so-called 'A.B.C.D. encirclement' of Japan, was captured within three months of the outbreak of the war, the oilfields of Borneo and Sumatra fell into Japanese hands, and the 'fence' of the Indian Ocean was broken down by the conquest of Java and of the shores of the Sunda and Malacca Straits.

After the attainment of the line formed by Sumatra, Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands eastward to Timor the Japanese announced that they now had 'all the materials necessary for a protracted war'. Their leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the initial campaign of conquest was only a preliminary to the real struggle which must be waged against 'Anglo-America'. They know that they cannot strike a mortal blow against either Britain or the U.S.A. by the seizure of their colonial territories in the Western Pacific and they know they must expect sooner or later a determined counter-offensive from the nations they have attacked. At the time of writing Japan has subdued territories which give her the essentials of that autarky of war potential at



THE SOUTH SEA LANDS

which her Army and Navy have aimed. Japan has made war primarily to attain such autarky, to make herself immune against embargoes and blockade, above all to possess oilfields under her own control. Now she has them and it is her possession of them which is the first condition of her ability to hold them. Without the oil of the East Indies Japan could not have faced a protracted major war; she has undertaken a major war in order to get it and with it her power is vastly increased, but only as long as she can hold Borneo and Sumatra and can protect her sea communications to the south.

The present war in the Pacific is in the first place a duel between Japan and the U.S.A., with Japan fighting on her own side of the ocean. America's advantage lies in a vastly greater industrial productive capacity, but in order to bring this to bear offensively against Japan, America must build up bases with secure communications on the further shores of the Pacific. Japan now holds the inner seas of the Western Pacific within a triangle which has the most northerly of the Kurile Islands as its apex and a line from Sumatra to New Guinea as its base. The U.S.A. can advance against the Japanese position either westward step by step along the line of the Marshall and Caroline Islands or northwards from Australia. She could also attack from Kamchatka and the Siberian Maritime Province, if Russia were to become a belligerent against Japan, and this would be the strategy most directly menacing to Japan itself. There is fourthly the possibility of an offensive in and from China, but this seems the least promising, because of the inadequacy of communications with China, even if new road links from Assam can be constructed and kept open in the near future.


Whatever the course of the war, the U.S.A. is now committed to waging it in the Asiatic side of the Pacific—or else accepting defeat and recognizing Japan's 'New Order in Greater East Asia'. If America wins this war and crushes Japan, she will have a decisive ascendancy of power in the seas of the Far East and a *de facto* control over the whole South Sea Region, whatever nominal sovereignties she may be willing to preserve. On land

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the eclipse of Japan would leave China with a paramountcy corresponding to her former rôle as the 'Middle Kingdom' and Korea, Annam, Siam and Burma would tend to return within her orbit of cultural and political influence. There is indeed to be observed amid the shocks of war the acceleration of a historic process which consists in the replacement of the 'East India' domains of West European Powers—Portugal, Spain, Holland, Britain, France and Germany—by nations whose homelands are on the borders of the Pacific. The American conquest of the Philippines from Spain in 1898 was the first step in this process; the division of Germany's Far Eastern colonial possessions between Japan and Australia after the war of 1914-18 was the second. To-day, with the Japanese ruling in Hanoi, Singapore and Batavia, an American general commanding in Australia and China holding formal command on behalf of the United Nations in Siam and Indo-China, it is evident that there can be no simple return to the *status quo ante*, however the fortune of war may turn out.

NOTE ON MAP 33

This map indicates the contrast between the zone of earlier Japanese expansion to the north of the Great Wall of China and the recent sphere of aggression in the South Seas. A heavy black line encloses Manchuria and Mongolia, the region with which the Japanese Army chauvinists were primarily concerned at the time of the composition of the famous 'Tanaka Memorial' in 1927. If Japan had gained control of the whole area up to Altai, she would have had a huge wedge of territory separating China from Siberia and outflanking the Far Eastern position of the U.S.S.R. However, after the conquest of Manchuria Japan desisted from invading Outer Mongolia owing to the protection given to the Mongol Republic by the U.S.S.R. After 1937 the war in China led Japan more and more to the south, though the original intention appears to have been to limit the campaign to North China. It remains to be seen whether Japan, having now extended her empire south to Burma, Java and New Guinea, will once again turn north.



33. GREATER EAST ASIA

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